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ABSTRACT 
Democracy and the Environment in Latin America 
by 
Javier Albert Escamilla 
Dr. Dennis Pirages, Examination Committee Chair 
Professor of Political Science 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
 
 This study examines the ability of democratic and non-democratic 
states alike to protect the environment. Democracy has long been an 
important concept in the study of politics and environmental protection 
is an increasingly important issue in world politics. Advocates of 
democracy claim democratic states are better able to protect the 
environment than non-democracies. In contrast there are those that 
argue democracy’s emphasis on individual rights leads to excessive 
resource consumption. This thesis employs a mixed methods approach 
to determine if democratic countries protect the environment more than 
their non-democratic counterparts. In short democracies do protect the 
environment better than non-democracies but certain conditions must be 
met. It is argued that democracy is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition to ensure greater environmental protection. This study restricts 
analysis to Latin America which allows for a more focused and detailed 
analysis of cases with various levels of democracy. This allows for greater 
inspection as to the effect the institutions have on environmental 
protection. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Democracy is an important concern in the study of international 
relations and comparative politics. Indeed, Latin American political 
research has referred to democracy as the “master concept” since much 
of the literature revolves around the use of the term (Munck 2007, 26). 
Much literature has focused on the effect that democracy has on dispute 
settlement, peace processes, trade negotiations, environmental 
protection, and international law (Payne 1995; Chan 1997). This work 
focuses on the ability of democratic states to protect the environment.  
It is claimed by theorists that democracies protect the environment 
better than non-democracies (Payne 1995, Paehlke 1988). The most 
general reason given is that democratic states are responsible to citizen 
groups who petition for a safer living environment. Payne (1995) offers 
five reasons why democracies have better environmental conditions: 
individual rights, regime responsiveness, political learning, 
internationalism, and open marketplace of ideas. 
 Each reason given assumes certain actions will be performed and 
that the institutions will be responsive to citizen demands. The claim 
that individual rights will lead to citizen demands for environmental 
protection. It is more likely that citizens in developing states will demand 
greater social equity.  Regime responsiveness assumes states have the 
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resources to respond. In other words the claim assumes states have the 
capacity in terms of organization, expertise, and fiscal resources to 
enforce environmental regulations. Political learning assumes elite has 
emerged willing to address the problem of environmental degradation. 
However, depending upon how a state transitioned to democracy will 
determine how institutions function. In many cases a transition to 
democracy does not result in a transfer of power (i.e. Guatemala 1988, 
Chile 1990). Internationalism assumes foreign states will petition and/or 
share technologies to protect the environment. This ignores foreign 
state’s preoccupation with only those areas that affect the international 
commons (i.e. air and oceanic pollution). Finally, open market place of 
ideas assumes such ideas will be acted upon. Simply because a state 
becomes democratic does not necessarily mean that heretofore neglected 
ideas will be heeded. All the reasons Payne points to are debatable 
especially since individual rights are the cause, according to some for 
environmental degradation.  
 By contrast some theorists claim democracy’s emphasis on 
individual rights leads to excessive consumption, overpopulation, 
corruption, and negligence (Ophuls 1973; Ehrlich 1989; Hardin 1968; 
and Heilbroner 1980). The view by these authors is the emphasis on 
individual rights, especially economic rights, inevitably leads to an 
overall decline of the community’s right to a clean environment as a 
result of excessive use of the environment. Ophuls (1973) critiques the 
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claim by economists that technological breakthroughs will overcome 
resource scarcity. In his opinion, increased technological capacity 
depends on scarce resources; which entails greater extraction of scarcer 
materials. This makes the costs of production rise while the quantity of a 
product does not rise. Ehrlich (1989) argues that unrestricted population 
growth leads to increasingly polluted land. In a democracy growth cannot 
be restricted nor can consumption patterns which lead to greater use of 
the commons. Heilbroner (1980) argues that in democratic states the 
business elite have greater influence than the average citizen. The elite 
will oppose any efforts that hurt their interests. This is a possibility but it 
is equally possible under authoritarian rule as it is under democratic 
rule.  
This paper explores the ability of states democratic and non-
democratic alike to protect the environment. The argument Payne and 
others put forth may be valid but require institutions responsive to the 
population, non-clientelistic behavior in political affairs and the 
bureaucracy, along with greater economic equality. However, all too often 
authors consider an idealized version of democracy which does not 
parallel reality in many respects. The idealization of democracy is 
common and for this reason a subsequent section examines various 
conceptualizations and measurements of democracy. In short, most 
measures of democracy examine procedural aspects. These measures 
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neglect levels of representativeness which is what advocates of 
democracy assume exist in all democracies.  
This chapter proceeds as follows. A review of the theoretical 
literature is provided followed by a review of the empirical literature. The 
following section addresses the question, what is democracy? The final 
section examines the importance of institutions in the democratic 
process and how the balance of power within the state determines the 
ability of the state to protect the environment. 
Theoretical Review 
 Payne’s theoretical framework has been the most referenced work 
regarding the relationship between democracy and the environment. His 
attention to political rights has been the source of protection, giving 
support for those that advocate democracy. Most attention has been 
given to political rights and how the free flow of information will allow 
environmental groups to raise awareness of issues and push for 
legislation (Schultz and Crockett 1990; Payne 1995). Under democratic 
rule environmental groups are more easily formed and have more 
influence over public opinion and more access to individual legislators 
than under authoritarian rule. Kotov and Nikitina (1995) claim 
democracies are more responsive to environmental needs as a result of 
electoral accountability, and the ability of groups to mobilize and achieve 
political representation. Democracies are said to have greater respect for 
the rule of law which leads them to follow environmental agreements 
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more than non-democracies (Weiss and Jacobsen 1999). Congleton 
(1992) argues elites, who are presumed to be less pro-environment, 
control the political process in authoritarian states which prevents 
environmental protection. Congleton also notes that authoritarian 
regimes have a shorter time horizon than democracies. Authoritarian 
rulers care less about long term consequences because they may not be 
in power when the negative externalities become readily apparent.  
Those who claim democracy leads to greater environmental 
protection make many assumptions. The first is the willingness of the 
masses to petition the state to protect the environment. In many poor 
states people may be willing to tolerate some environmental degradation 
for faster economic growth. This perspective also assumes there are 
channels of influence within the state that are accessible to 
environmental groups. They assume the state has the resources and 
ability to respond to the demands of the masses. Yet state capacity has 
not been addressed in the literature, a shortcoming addressed in the 
following chapters. Environmental protection requires expertise, constant 
oversight, and the ability to enforce laws which many states (democratic 
and authoritarian alike) do not possess. Environmental degradation 
comes in many forms which leads to numerous environmental groups 
that many assume will be homogenous; this assumption may not be 
true. A final assumption is that elected officials control the resources of 
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the state but in Latin America the distribution of power is mixed and 
varied leading Karl (1995) to label many regimes “hybrid regimes.”  
 There are theorists who claim democracy’s emphasis on individual 
rights and economic freedoms lead to greater environmental degradation. 
These theorists provide convincing theoretical support for Hardin’s 
(1968) famous “tragedy of the commons” which holds that unrestricted 
use of the commons leads to excessive consumption, environmental 
mismanagement, and unrestricted resource exploitation. This oft cited 
work demonstrates what is individually rational is collectively 
suboptimal. For this reason the collective action problem is an important 
issue to environmental protection. Paehlke (1996) argues that the 
economy and environment have global significance while democracy 
functions only at the local or national level. This does, however, neglect 
the fact that most environmental problems are national, regional or local. 
Also, proposed solutions to environmental problems are often local. 
Heilbroner (1974) and Ehrlich (1978) point to the inability of democratic 
states to restrict the growth of the population which then leads to greater 
resource consumption. Democracies tend to be market economies which 
give business groups greater clout in the political process than 
environmental groups (Dryzek 1968). Midlarsky (1998) points to gridlock 
over environmental protection issues. Gridlock occurs because elected 
politicians want to win as many votes as possible which leads to greater 
compromises on environmental issues.  
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Those who claim democracy leads to greater environmental 
degradation assume authoritarian regimes will protect the environment. 
This would occur if “ecological kings” were to govern the state, but if 
history is to be a guide economic growth is of greater importance than 
environmental protection to democracies and authoritarian regimes 
alike. Dryzek’s (1987) claim that the elite control the political process 
under democracy is just as true under authoritarian regimes. The 
gridlock that Midlarsky (1998) points to will not occur under 
authoritarian rule simply because such issues will not be considered to 
begin in the first place. When there is a lack of environmental 
degradation it has been the result of an inability to exploit the resource 
as opposed to a desire to protect. The claim by Heilbroner (1974) and 
Ehrlich (1978) is complicated but population trends indicate greater 
economic growth leads to slower population growth. The lag it takes for 
this to occur does however pose problems for the environment. The 
proponents of democracy put forth an idealized version of democracy 
while the critics of democracy implicitly assume authoritarian rulers 
would have more capacity.  
Background Literature 
The relationship between democracy and the environment has 
been addressed sparsely in the literature and has lacked large-N 
statistical analysis. This is partly due to a lack of quality data on 
environmental indicators which has plagued the area of environmental 
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politics in general. Only certain indicators have been recorded for a long 
period of time. The indicators which have sufficient data for time-series 
analysis are: carbon dioxide emissions (CO2), PM10, and protected land 
as a percentage of total land (PROTECT). The existing literature, which is 
reviewed below, shows mixed results and questionable findings. 
The research by Midlarsky (1998) examines five types of 
environmental conditions and uses three different measures of 
democracy. However, his research is limited in scope because it only 
looks at one point in time as opposed to looking at how states treat their 
territory over a period of time. The conclusions he arrives at show that 
democracy is not better at preventing a rise in CO2 emissions, soil 
erosion, or deforestation. The only variable that showed democracy is 
best for the environment is protected land area; democracy had no effect 
on fresh water availability or soil erosion by chemicals (358). His results 
are mixed and the lack of time-series analysis results in an inability to 
conclude if environmental degradation is subject to change with time 
under either regime type.  
 Congleton (1992) claims democracies have stricter environmental 
regulations than non-democracies, but he is unable to demonstrate if 
regulations are enforced. He also focuses on international environmental 
agreements, such as the Montreal Protocol and the Vienna Convention, 
and concludes democracies sign environmental agreements more than 
authoritarian regimes. However, today the results would be different 
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because most states have signed both agreements. At most he can claim 
democracies sign sooner, but we are still unable to determine if states 
live up to said agreements. Neumayer (2002) examines multi-lateral 
environmental agreements (MEAs) and concludes democracies commit 
themselves to more environmental agreements than non-democracies. 
Neumayer’s study has the same problem as Congleton (1992), namely 
the lack of information on ability to enforce regulations. Many states 
could sign and never live up to the agreement’s principles. It also fails to 
tell us what the internal costs of compliance are. For instance Mali is a 
member to the International Whaling Commission (IWC) but it does not 
whale so signing the agreement does not hurt Mali’s interests. 
 Barret and Graddy (2000) effectively show that democracy lowers 
sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions but the results for water pollution were 
not statistically significant. Torras and Boyce (1998) find higher levels of 
democracy leads to lower air pollution, SO2 and particulate emissions, 
and decreases water pollution. Scruggs (1998) finds results opposite to 
those of Torras and Boyce (1998) despite using the same environmental 
indicators. These results raise questions about the robustness of 
democracy as a predictor of environmental conditions. 
 Li and Reuveny (2006) use time series data and a large data set to 
look at five environmental indicators: CO2 emissions, nitrogen oxide, land 
degradation, deforestation, and organic pollution in water. The main 
shortcoming is that they did not include a regional indicator to 
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distinguish the developing world from the developed world. The analysis 
which shows democracies do protect the environment better may simply 
be a result of state capacity not necessarily democracy. The richer 
countries have less pollution per capita than poorer countries which tend 
to be authoritarian1. The missing variable is the ability of states to 
protect the environment. Another problem is the environmental 
indicators used, especially deforestation, is something that was not 
occurring in the developed world simply because those forests had been 
deforested prior to the time horizon of the analysis. 
 It should be clear that prior research has had limitations, 
methodological problems, and that the statistical results of some studies 
contradict the findings of others. For these reasons further work on this 
question is warranted. This research begins with statistical analysis to 
determine whether democratic states protect the environment better than 
non-democracies. The findings, not surprisingly are mixed. Therefore, 
qualitative work must be conducted to determine why some democratic 
states protect the environment more than others and if there is a 
difference between authoritarian states and democratic states.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 The main exception to this would be the United States which pollutes more than most 
if not all developing states. 
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What is Democracy? 
 Democracy has been among the most important concepts in the 
study of comparative politics but as yet there is no consensus as to how 
it should be defined or how to measure it. Various measurements have 
been advocated that could be called maximalist, minimalist, and 
procedural. There are weaknesses in each. Maximalist definitions lead to 
too narrow a concept which limits the generalization and minimalist 
definitions typically examine only elections which neglects “who exercises 
power” (Munck and Verkuilen 2002, 12). For example the President of 
Iran is elected, but it is the Supreme Leader who has “effective” control 
over the political process and the military. So while Iran may appear to 
be democratic under the minimalist definition it is not under other 
definitions. The two approaches lead to what Collier and Levitsky (1997) 
refer to as “democracy with adjectives” which refers to the creation of 
new concepts which have little use.  
 As noted above democracy is said to alleviate many of society’s ills, 
but not much thought (in previous empirical work on this topic) has been 
given to the conceptualization and measurement of democracy. The 
literature reviewed above refers to data mostly from Freedom House or 
the Polity IV datasets. However, there are limitations to both which lead 
to substantive differences. Freedom House has many components under 
its two attributes “political rights” and “civil liberties” which are not 
necessarily related. The Polity IV dataset identifies “competitiveness” and 
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“regulation of participation” which are two of the most important 
components of democracy, but not sufficient to address the question of 
“who effectively governs.” Another issue of concern is “replicability” as 
only Polity IV grants enough information to replicate the dataset with 
precision. Freedom House lacks inter-coder testing and the information 
necessary to replicate the data (Munck and Verkuilen 2002, 19-20). This 
means that different people looking at the same data could lead different 
classifications. 
Most regimes in Latin America (and elsewhere) do not fully satisfy 
the requirements of democracy, namely civilian control over the military, 
which makes a dichotomous variable less robust. As a result the 
dichotomous dataset established by Przeworski et al (2000) is 
insufficient. Przeworski et al (2000) reject the existence of borderline 
regimes between democracy and authoritarian, but such dichotomy 
neglects the procedural nature of democratization. No contemporary state 
emerged from authoritarian rule fully democratic. Institutions which 
protect political rights, civil liberties and foster democratic participation 
require time and experimentation to develop. For these reasons the Polity 
dataset will be used. 
Any classification of democracy must include the components 
which are necessary for effective representation yet not broad enough to 
be inapplicable. The most stringent democracy characterization would be 
Robert Dahl’s classic contribution (1971). However, the opposite is 
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equally true and just as common. Przeworski et al (2000) and 
Schumpeter (1942) give great importance to procedural aspects of free 
and fair elections, but scant attention to the protection of political rights 
and civil liberties which enable free and fair elections to occur. The Polity 
dataset may have its flaws but in comparison to the rest it is superior. 
However, it will be seen that many states categorized as democratic 
do not represent the people which elected them. This is a result of weak 
institutions and political patronage appointments. Such appointments 
compromise the ability of many state institutions to establish policies 
which benefit society. Many studies of democracy rest upon the belief 
that democracy represents the interests of the masses. This is not always 
the case though. Most states categorized as democratic in the various 
indices get at the procedural dimensions of democracy not how 
representative the state is. Representative democracies are those states 
that achieve the procedural dimension of democracy but also listen to 
and act upon the demands of the population. It is the representative 
nature that inherently makes democracy more suitable to environmental 
protection. However, none of the democracy indices measure 
representativeness for this reason statistical analysis can be misleading.  
Consequently this study uses a mixed methods approach to 
determine statistically the relationship between democracy and the 
environment. The statistical analysis is followed by comparative case 
studies of states with differing regime types and various levels of 
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representativeness. If all democratic states were representative statistical 
analysis would not be as disparate as it currently is. However, 
representativeness also assumes states have the capacity to respond to 
the demands of the populace. For this reason the following section 
examines state capacity and its impact on environmental protection. 
Other Factors Affecting Environmental Protection 
The ability of the state, or state capacity, is essential to 
environmental protection. State capacity refers to the ability of states to 
“have the capacity, in terms of organizational cohesion, expertise, and 
extractive and coercive ability, to carry out decisions based on their 
preferences” (Geddes 1990, 217). In other words, state capacity refers to 
the ability of the state to perform its delegated duties. In many instances 
the state is incapable of performing. This can come about for a number 
of reasons including powerful interests in society, military threat, lack of 
experience and expertise, incompetence, and uncommitted bureaucrats. 
 Weyland (1996) identifies three forms of organization: personalism, 
segmentalism, and universalism (32-37). Universalism implies that the 
bureaucracy puts the interests of the state before their own interests and 
views the whole citizenry as their constituency. Segmentalism is when 
bureaucracy responds to a narrow group and their demands. The final 
category is personalism, or clientelism, whereby businesspeople ask for 
particular favors and hinder collective action among civil society. The 
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type of organization that typifies the bureaucracy is going to have 
important effects on achieving state goals. 
There are institutional features that can also prevent the ability of 
the state to act upon environmental degradation. Principally the 
delegation of powers within the state can hinder or foster the ability of 
the state to enact reform. The powers of the executive over the 
bureaucracy, powers to create legislation, and control the legislative 
agenda affect a leader’s ability to initiate reform. The formation and 
organization of party systems greatly affects the ability of legislatures to 
pass laws. In a state with a highly fragmented party system it is much 
more difficult to get legislation passed. The powers of the bureaucracy 
are central to the implementation of legislation. When the bureaucracy is 
given too much autonomy rent seeking and clientelistic behavior is more 
likely2. The opposite is equally troublesome. Too much oversight could 
lead to selective policy implementation based upon an elected official’s 
interests. A proper balance must be developed among the executive, 
legislature, and the bureaucracy to ensure clientelistic behavior is not 
rampant. 
Geddes (1994) notes three prerequisites for the state bureaucracy: 
expertise in bureaucratic agencies, an efficient concentration of scarce 
resources, and a committed bureaucracy to achieve goals so as to keep 
                                                 
2 Rent seeking refers to bureaucrats using their position of influence as a way to extract 
monetary benefits from individuals pursuing their own self-interests. In contrast 
clientelistic behavior refers to bureaucrats serving only certain sectors of the 
population. 
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jobs (218). Implied in these three characteristics is a bureaucracy 
susceptible to losing their jobs for poor performance, non-clientelistic 
behavior, and bureaucrats with expertise. In addition to these factors I 
would add administrative autonomy from elected officials. When a 
fragmented party system exists the executive must make concessions for 
short term political survival which leads to appointment of non-
technocratic officials in bureaucratic positions which control significant 
resources. This is what Geddes (1994) refers to as “the politician’s 
dilemma.” A proper balance is needed though. A bureaucracy too 
constrained will be unable to look at the nation as a whole as its 
constituency, only the interests of the traditional elite will be heeded 
(Weyland 1996). The universalist perspective would lead bureaucrats to 
disregard the demands of politicians to pursue the best interests of the 
public at large. A key component to measuring competence in the 
bureaucracy is entrance exams and the absence of life tenure systems. 
Both of these components have been misused in Latin America which 
has hindered the ability of the state to address many facets of social life.  
An essential component of democracy is the ability of civil society 
groups to emerge. Such groups have emerged across Latin America but 
their success has been uneven. This is due to fragmented institutions 
within states which allows for the continued practice of clientelism. 
Another problem with civil society groups is they have divergent interests 
which are not necessarily compatible. Therefore, the homogeneity often 
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assumed by civil society advocates is often absent (Diamond 1994). 
Furthermore, many of the bureaucratic institutions that civil society 
must petition for reform are political appointments and therefore do not 
concern themselves with public opinion. These bureaucrats shape 
policies which serve their own interests or the interests of the industrial 
sectors they represent. For this reason civil society groups have not been 
effective in pushing for reform.  
For all these reasons democracy does not function the way many 
suppose. Many take an idealized version of democracy which ignores 
political reality. This reality demands political compromises on certain 
issues. Many states have institutions which were designed to be weak 
and to cause gridlock (Ames 2001). This gridlock ensures the continued 
status quo. It also allows for the traditional elite to control the policy 
process so it serves their interests not the interests of society as a whole. 
For all these reasons it is necessary to examine institutions within a 
state. How they were created, why they were created, the intention of 
those who created the institutions, and the power of the institutions 
must be examined to discern why environmental protection is only 
sometimes addressed. In short, democracy is not the panacea many 
presume it to be. It can be made effective but the establishment of 
institutions in the early phases of the transition affects the state’s ability 
to conduct affairs with impartiality.  
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Plan of the Thesis 
The second chapter attempts to improve upon the existing 
statistical analysis using appropriate regression techniques. However, 
the data determines the techniques used and as always with 
environmental data the quality of data is questionable. In short the 
statistical analysis shows that democracies are not better protectors of 
the environment. This thesis defends the advocates of democracy but 
with certain caveats. Democracies protect the environment better but the 
state needs two factors to do so: the resources (in terms of economic 
resources and technical expertise) to protect the environment and the 
will to do so. It is not sufficient for the people to want greater 
environmental protection the state must have the capacity to protect the 
environment and the willingness to do so. In many states people want 
greater environmental protection but due to institutional weakness, 
fragmented political parties, weak executives, and clientelistic oriented 
bureaucracies words do not turn into action. For these reasons I argue 
democracy is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for greater 
environmental protection. The work herein focuses on the distribution of 
power within the state. Specifically the powers of the executive, the 
legislature, and the bureaucracy are examined. Some would caution 
against such an approach for most environmental problems are local, 
regional, or global not necessarily national. The unit of analysis, 
however, will remain at the national level for two reasons. First, data 
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availability is at the national level. Second, most environmental decision 
making occurs at the national level (Gleditsch and Sverdrup 2002, 57). 
For these reasons analysis is restricted to the national level which is 
where state resources are distributed and political power is concentrated. 
Non governmental organizations (NGOs) are examined in the comparative 
case studies to see how they influence policy. The importance of NGOs is 
secondary to that of the state. This is a result of the state having the 
necessary resources to enforce environmental protection. The role of 
NGOs is simply to push the state to act and is therefore of secondary 
importance. 
The third and fourth chapters examine institutional arrangements 
within four Latin America states. More specifically, I will examine formal 
powers of the executive and the legislature. Much literature that focuses 
on the institutional capabilities of various states examines the formal 
powers of the legislature and the executive independently of each other. 
This, however, is an inadequate approach. Shugart and Carey (1992) 
rightly recommend the examination of the distribution of power within 
the state. Each branch must be considered with regard to the power of 
the other. In essence, power is a zero sum game even in domestic 
politics. The autonomy and effectiveness of the bureaucracy is examined, 
especially its relationship with the executive and legislature, to determine 
the type of influence civil society groups can have. Civil society groups 
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are examined in each chapter to determine their influence in the policy 
process. 
 Chapter two contrasts two states categorized as democratic Brazil 
and Costa Rica. Brazil has a poor record of environmental protection, 
while Costa Rica has been a leader in the area. These states were chosen 
because they have many commonalities aside from being democratic, 
including having strong legislatures, a populace that demands 
environmental protection, relatively high levels of economic wealth, and a 
lot of biodiversity. In other words both states have the necessary 
resources to protect the environment and the populace demanding such 
protection. Chapter three contrasts two states categorized as either not 
democratic (Guatemala) or semi-democratic (Chile). These states were 
chosen because they have one of the two necessary requisites to 
environmental protection. Guatemala has lacked the resources for 
protection yet the population has demanded protection; Chile has lacked 
the demand to protect the environment yet has the resources to do so if 
compelled to. The final chapter makes comparisons across all four states 
and makes the case as to how democracy is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for environmental protection. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
 The relationship between democracy and the environment has 
been previously investigated by Li & Reuveny (2006), Midlarsky (1998), 
Congleton (1992), Neumayer (2002), Barret and Graddy (2000), Torras 
and Boyce (1998), and Scruggs (1998). These studies have had 
limitations which have been reviewed in the preceding chapter. This 
study departs from previous work by focusing upon Latin America 
exclusively and on the time period of 1975-2007. 
 This study is unique in its use of cross sectional time series 
analysis to focus on a developing region. This strategy has certain 
benefits. First, it permits comparison of states that have similar cultures 
and political experiences. The concentration on a geographic region helps 
isolate the origins of environmental protection. A global analysis may 
mistakenly attribute the cause of environmental protection to democracy 
when in fact the cause could reside elsewhere (e.g. level of development). 
By examining a particular region, with similar political culture we can 
determine other sources of environmental protection. It allows us to 
compare states at different levels of economic development and different 
levels of democracy. The former difference allows us to examine state 
capacity. Richer states have the ability in terms of fiscal resources and 
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human capital to make environmental protection work. The latter 
difference allows for comparisons across regime types.  
 A necessary prerequisite for environmental protection to occur in 
any state is demand from the citizenry for such protection. In any state, 
democratic or not, environmental protection will not be an issue, unless 
there is some segment of the population is pushing an environmental 
agenda. Table 2.1 shows the position of respondents in Latin America 
that favor environmental protection even if it leads to slower economic 
growth. Respondents have consistently placed environmental protection 
above economic growth. This runs contrary to Maslow’s “hierarchy of 
needs” argument which holds only when basic needs are met will 
aesthetic concerns become an issue of concern. The majority of citizens 
in Latin America live in poverty, according to World Bank classification. 
 
 
Table 2.1 Public Opinion toward Environmental Protection 
Year Environment Economic Growth Expertise 
1995 29% 21% 57% 
2000 53% 31% 53% 
2005 61% 28% 62% 
Source: World Values Survey 
 
  
The column environment shows that respondents over time have 
increasingly favored environmental protection even at the expense of 
economic growth. The column economic growth shows the percentage of 
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respondents favoring economic growth at the expense of the 
environment. This column peaks in year 2000 then drops in 2005; 
whereas respondents favoring the environment have continuously grown.  
Despite low levels of wealth, the masses are increasingly demanding 
greater environmental protection. Another necessary condition for 
environmental protection is that bureaucratic recruitment be based on 
merit; this condition has not been met in Latin America. Table 2.1 also 
shows how the public feels about “experts” making policy decisions. A 
majority is consistently in favor of experts injecting expertise into policy 
making. This condition has been problematic in many states as a result 
of patronage appointments. Patronage appointments are made for a 
number of reasons such as to build electoral coalitions, reward voter 
support, or simple rent seeking behavior. The respondents favoring 
experts in positions of influence illustrates the discord between society 
and political elites who continue patronage appointments. It is clear that 
respondents in Latin America favor meritocratic recruitment. 
Statistical Models 
 The regression model used in this analysis is a pooled time series 
cross sectional (TSCS). In time series analysis a given time point is the 
unit of analysis whereas in panel analysis it is the individual, in this case 
the state (Markus 1979, 7). This model has the additional benefit of 
capturing variation across units and time which has the subsequent 
effect of more confident results (Sayrs 1989, 7).  
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This analysis differs from other studies in that a greater emphasis 
is on the state’s ability, or lack thereof, to protect the environment. For 
this reason appropriate variables are included to measure state capacity, 
namely gross domestic product per capita (GDP2) and tax revenue as a 
percentage of GDP.3 
Dependent Variables 
 The dependent variables in this analysis follow previous research 
by focusing on anthropocentric sources of environmental degradation. 
The dependent variable4 with the longest time series is carbon dioxide 
emissions per capita (CO2) for the years 1975-2005. A second measure is 
protected area (PROTECT) as a percentage of total land area for the years 
1990-2004. A third measure is PM10 (PM10), measured by microgram 
per cubic meter, covers the period of 1990-2005. This variable is 
normalized with gross domestic product (not per capita) to control for 
differences in economic size. The indicator reflects the level of industrial 
activity, the pollution from which is the source of respiratory problems 
throughout the developing world. While these indicators were chosen as 
a result of their availability they do provide useful comparisons with 
other states. For instance CO2 and PROTECT are both of significant 
interest to the international community. In contrast, PM10 is of little 
                                                 
3 All abbreviations inside parenthesis refer to the output used in STATA for this reason 
subscripts will not be used. 
4
 The data used in this analysis is also largely used in previous statistical work. The 
data were collected from the WDI the sole exception is Protected land as a percentage of 
total land which comes from the UN Statistics Division. 
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importance to the international community therefore does not receive 
much attention from the international community simply because the 
hazard posed by this type of pollution does not cross borders whereas 
the others do. However, it is still a good indicator of environmental 
degradation. 
 Independent Variables 
The measure of democracy used will be the Polity dataset. This 
variable has been used in much of the empirical literature reviewed 
above and in other fields as well. The Polity data have been found to be 
more reliable and accurate than Freedom House data by Mainwaring et 
al (2007). The difference between Polity and Freedom House data is the 
emphasis on different aspects of democracy. Polity specifically looks at 
measuring political competition; whereas Freedom House focuses on 
political rights and civil liberties. The Polity dataset ensure inter-coder 
reliability whereas Freedom House does not5. 
 Appropriate control variables are necessary to prevent spurious 
correlations and/or omitted variable bias. For this reason theoretically 
relevant variables are introduced to get at the source of environmental 
protection. The control variables used in this analysis largely follow 
previous empirical work. Gross domestic product per capita (in constant 
2000 U.S. dollars) is introduced in response to Maslow’s “Hierarchy of 
Needs” hypothesis and the Environmental Kuznets curve literature. The 
                                                 
5 Inter-coder reliability refers to the ability of multiple individuals looking at the same 
data, with the same rule making, coming to the same conclusion. 
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expectation is that as GDP/capita increases pollution will decrease. This 
is expected for two reasons. First, an increased standard of living results 
in a shift to more aesthetic concerns (Maslow 1943). Second, it is 
expected that as states generate more wealth the potential to protect the 
environment is strengthened. However, the relationship between 
GDP/capita and environmental protection may be non-linear. To correct 
for non-linearity in the model, the squared term of GDP is used, (GDP2 is 
the name of the variable in the model results). 
 A proxy measure of state capacity is the ability of state’s to tax its 
populations. This measure does not vary as a result of regime type. 
Rather, tax rates vary only as a result of state capacity (Cheibub 1998). 
Tax as a percentage of total state revenue (TAX) is introduced to measure 
state capacity. It is expected that as tax rates increase the ability of the 
state to perform its delegated duties and achieve its goals will be 
enhanced (Hendrix 2009; Cheibub 1998; Garrett 1998; Fauvelle-Aymar 
1999). This covariate was dropped for the CO2 model for two reasons. 
The data gathered only began in the 1990s to early 2000s, and, for this 
reason, would not affect the other variables. Since CO2 begins in 1975 
the n-size is drastically reduced and analysis would not begin until the 
1990s.  
 Population change (POPCH) is another variable excluded by much 
of the literature. As population increases, the strain on the carrying 
capacity of the natural environment also increases leading to greater 
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environmental degradation (Malthus 2004, Hardin 1968, Ophuls 1977). 
The data have been gathered as a percentage change over the years 
1975-2004 from the WDI database. In the context of this model it is 
expected that as population increases environmental conditions will 
worsen. 
 Trade openness (TRADE) is expected to decrease environmental 
pollution. The control for trade is included to test Payne’s hypothesis that 
a freer market place of ideas will lead to greater environmental 
protection. In other words Payne assumes a free market place of ideas 
will lead to cleaner technologies being used. This measure allows us to 
determine how open a state is to foreign investment. A parallel to this 
would be: the freer an economy is to trade the more likely cleaner 
technologies will be adopted from abroad. This model follows Li and 
Reuveny’s (2006) technique which holds that the sum of exports and 
imports divided by GDP (not per capita) will gauge the level of openness 
in the economy. 
 Each dependent variable is lagged (t-1) and included as an 
independent variable to correct for correlation among error terms within 
each unit (state). To control for heteroscedasticty panel corrected 
standard errors (PCSE) is used (Beck & Katz 1995; 1996). The high R2 is 
a consequence of this technique but is required for proper specification6. 
 
                                                 
6 The R2 for CO2 would be .49, for PM10 .35, and for PROTECT .47 otherwise. 
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Results 
 Table 2.2 displays the results. Beginning with the model for CO2, 
we find that the POLITY index does have a significant effect on CO2 
emissions. However, the direction of the coefficient indicates that as 
democracy increases so too do emissions. This is contrary to what the 
advocates of democracy predict. GDP2 is significant and shows as states 
become wealthier a rise in emissions follows. The last variable that shows 
significance, albeit not at the standard social science threshold, is 
POPCH which shows an increase in population will lead to a rise in 
emissions. No other variables had significance and all significant 
variables led to a rise in CO2 emissions. 
The data for PM10 has the least variables achieving significant 
levels. An interesting finding is that an increase in TAX leads to an 
increase in PM10 emissions, again not at the traditional .05 level. No 
other variables were significant for this model. The final model is 
PROTECT which also had interesting findings. The POLITY variable 
achieves significance at the .1 level and shows that an increase in 
democracy leads to lower levels of protect land. Population change shows 
an increase in protected land with an increase in population. No other 
variables achieved significant levels. This analysis has shown that 
contrary to what advocates of democracy presume environmental 
protection is not assured under democratic rule.  
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Table 2.2 Effect of Level of Democracy on Environmental            
Degradation 
 CO21 PM102 PROTECT3 
    
POLITY .0008*** 7.56e+08 -.0140* 
 (.0003) (2.30e+09) (.0072) 
    
GDP2 2.87e-09** -2707.21 -7.38e-10 
 (1.39e-09) (3529.388) (1.32e-08) 
    
POPCH .0239* -8.14e+10 .5417* 
 (.0142) (7.75e+10) (3120) 
    
TAX n/a .1684* .0383 
 n/a (.0720) (.0348) 
    
TRADE .0340 -1.39e+10 -.1722 
 (.0238) (5.69e+10) (.2753) 
    
LAGt-1 .9739*** .9912*** .9711*** 
 (.0181) (.0108) (.0214) 
    
Constant -.0365 3.51e+11 -.4139 
 (.0448) (2.31e+11) (.7358) 
    
Observations 522 132 121 
    
R2 .97 .99 .97 
1 TAX was excluded from the analysis because it dropped the n-size by over 300 
observations and shortened the time horizon of data 
2 Argentina is an outlier and was excluded from analysis 
3 Venezuela is an outlier and was excluded from analysis 
Panel corrected standard errors in parentheses 
*Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1% 
Outliers were found using scatter plots of their residuals 
 
 
Conclusions 
 The results of the regressions are contrary to the findings of many 
advocates of democracy. The variables that reach significance show that 
the environment is not better protected under democratic rule. 
Furthermore, the variable expected to measure state capacity (TAX) is in 
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contradiction to what is expected in stronger states. The variable TRADE 
achieves no significance in any of the models despite robust findings in 
the model provided by Li and Reuveny (2006) and statistical analysis 
runs counter to other studies and contributes to the empirical confusion 
about the relationship between democracy and the environment. The 
TRADE variable account for variations among states with regard to the 
influence of market forces and the ability of states to adopt “green” 
technologies. 
 This study is not without limitations. For instance the same 
models used here but with a global population could find different 
results. An important indicator that would need to be included is an 
indicator that would distinguish states based upon their level of 
economic development. An excellent classification system would be the 
World Bank categories. This indicator was not used in this analysis due 
to multicollinearity problems and Latin America does not meet the full 
spectrum of the classification.  
 The theoretical confusion and the mixed results of previous 
empirical work in addition to the results of this analysis demonstrate the 
need for qualitative research. Even if the results of statistical analysis 
were consistent across studies qualitative research would be needed 
given the questionable reliability of environmental data.  
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 The case studies that follow are contrary to the statistical analysis. 
The cases show how democratic states do protect the environment better 
than less democratic states. The substantive difference among states is 
the distribution of power within the state. This is something that has not 
been quantified, which furthers the need for case studies. A proper 
balance of power will make reform more likely which is necessary for 
environmental protection. It cannot be expected that the first efforts will 
be effective it takes time and experimentation to determine what will 
work. A state that inhibits reform from taking place will lead to unabated 
environmental degradation. The autonomy of the bureaucracy is also 
examined to determine the capacity of the state to achieve its stated 
goals. For these reasons the next two chapters conduct comparative case 
studies to show how the distribution of powers within the state lead to 
significant differences in environmental protection. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
BRAZIL AND COSTA RICA 
Brazil and Costa Rica are among the most affluent states in Latin 
America. These political systems are democratic and people are 
outspoken on issues. These states share many characteristics in their 
political institutions. Both are presidential, and have a legislature 
formally endowed with strong power relative to the executive. They also 
have a strong independent judiciary. The legislature has, however, ceded 
much power to the executive. The reasons for this are partly explained by 
the political system itself. In Costa Rica legislators are not permitted 
immediate re-election. This prevents the accumulation of policy expertise 
and the formation of standing committees to address issues of a long 
term nature. For this reason much policy begins with the executive and 
the cabinet; the latter are especially adept at policy making for there are 
no restrictions on the time they may serve. In Brazil the party system is 
highly fragmented and party discipline is non-existent; this is why the 
legislature produces very little policy. These are important differences 
which have resulted in significant differences in policy outcomes. 
Brazil and Costa Rica have two ingredients necessary for 
environmental protection – the resources to protect the environment and 
public demand for such protection. Many states have neither.  Some 
have one but not the other. But it is necessary to have both. A third 
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ingredient that must be added is a system open to reform which Costa 
Rica has and Brazil lacks. Environmental protection requires heavy 
investment which stipulates a healthy economy which both states have. 
The average GDP/capita7 in Latin America is USD 2,804. Brazil and 
Costa Rica are above that average with USD 3,503 and USD 3,480 
respectively. This shows that both are in a better position, relative to the 
average state in Latin America, to protect the environment if compelled to 
do so.  
This leads to the other necessary prerequisite – the desire to 
protect the environment. In a democracy the will of the state is supposed 
to reflect the will of the people. Therefore citizens must push their elected 
officials to protect the environment. Otherwise material wealth will be 
used for other purposes. In both states citizens have demanded a cleaner 
environment Costa Ricans have gotten it while Brazilians have not. The 
World Values Survey (WVS) reports that in 2005 60 percent of 
respondents in Latin America favored environmental protection even if it 
resulted in slower economic growth8.  Conditions in Costa Rica have 
gradually gotten better while conditions in Brazil have gotten worse (see 
tables 3.1 and 3.2). In short the fragmented party system in Brazil 
coupled with the absence of party discipline has prevented most reform 
                                                 
7 This is gross domestic product divide by total population for the years 1975-2007, 
data gathered from World ent Indicators. This is in constant U.S. dollars year 2000. 
8 The WVS has not been conducted in Costa Rica, the Latino Barometer ranks 
preferences so the question is not applicable, and I could not get access to the Latin 
American Public Opinion Project database. 
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from emerging. In addition the clientelistic nature of the bureaucracy has 
led to ineffective policy. In contrast strong party discipline and an 
autonomous bureaucracy have allowed Costa Rica to become one of the 
leaders in ecotourism and environmental protection in general.  
A Short Environmental History 
 
 Brazil has one of the most bio-diverse ecologies in the world. 
Within Brazil there are five regions highly sensitive to ecological 
disruption. The most obvious is the Amazon rainforest which is the 
world’s largest carbon sink. The Littoral and Mata Atlantica along the 
coastlines are being degraded by sewage, industrial toxins, trash, and 
shipping materials. The most biologically diverse wetlands in the world 
are in Alto Paraguai which is contaminated by mercury from gold mining, 
hunting, fishing, pollution, fertilizers, and hydroelectric projects. The 
Savanna is being rapidly industrialized and as a result the soil is being 
degraded. This area contains numerous plant and animal species that 
have not been studied, and the Pampas and Matas in the south contain 
large areas of grasslands that are being affected by agriculture 
expansion, slash and burn policies, and overall desertification (Peritore 
1999, 111-112). Brazil has made some attempt at environmental 
protection: cattle subsidies have been eliminated, national parks have 
emerged, and new agencies have been created. However, the elimination 
of subsidies was a requirement of IMF and World Bank loans, national 
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parks are financed by foreign states in an attempt to protect the area9, 
and the new bureaucracies do not have the resources or autonomy 
necessary to enforce regulations.  
 
 
Table 3.1 Environmental Indicators in Brazil 
Year CO2 PM10 NOX FOREST PROTECT GDP/Capita 
MILITARY 
SPENDING 
1980 1.56         3537.62   
1981 1.41         3304.36   
1982 1.38         3247.65   
1983 1.31         3066.53   
1984 1.29         3157.81   
1985 1.36         3337.34   
1986 1.47         3518.01   
1987 1.48         3568.99   
1988 1.46         3357.53 3.18 
1989 1.47         3353.01 2.35 
1990 1.4 40.23 227790 61.47 15.7 3285.51 2.60 
1991 1.46 40.72     16.67 3386.97 1.49 
1992 1.44 40.96     16.81 3514.59 1.45 
1993 1.49 39.74     16.89 3615.29 1.77 
1994 1.53 37.54     16.9 3637.93 1.57 
1995 1.6 33.23 15030   16.91 3704.59 1.89 
1996 1.74 32.14     16.91 3650.79 1.58 
1997 1.79 31.5     16.97 3606.13 1.86 
1998 1.85 31.41     17.11 3706.91 1.73 
1999 1.84 34.07     17.12 3701.93 1.54 
2000 1.86 32.76 27160 58.3 17.15 3746.85 1.58 
2001 1.88 33.49     18.1 3737.39 1.77 
2002 1.82 32.75     18.1 3896.97 1.94 
2003 1.72 30.26     18.1   1.51 
2004 1.8 28.16     18.1   1.37 
2005   25.71 83410 56.46     1.41 
Source: All data comes from the World Development Indicators except Protected land 
which comes from the United Nations Statistics Division 
 
                                                 
9 An irony of this is the Indigenous populations of the area have been evicted from the 
land which has made them less sensitive to environmental groups. The eviction was not 
anticipated by environmental groups. I was unable to find out if an agreement was 
reached which would allow the indigenous to return to the land.  
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The willingness of foreign entities to assist in environmental 
protection has been limited to preventing the destruction of the Amazon 
rainforest (Foweraker 2001, 865). Attempts have also been made to 
establish protected land areas in conjunction with non-governmental 
organizations. These attempts have been fairly successful but they are 
largely foreign financed which is indicative of the lack of resources the 
Brazilian state is willing to distribute for such projects (Rocha and 
Jacobson 1998, 938-939).  
An examination of the data in table 3.1 shows the emergence of 
democracy has not resulted in an overall improvement of most 
environmental indicators; the only exception is PM1010. Nitrous oxide 
emissions have continued to increase under the democratic regime, 
forest as a percentage of total land has continued to decline, CO2 
emissions per capita from 1980-1988 (authoritarian period) compared 
with 1988-2004 (democratic period) do not show much variation despite 
the transition to democracy. It would be expected that the longer a 
democratic regime is in place these indicators would drop with time. This 
has not been the case some indicators have gotten worse and CO2 has 
not changed. Some pressure for environmental protection comes from 
outside the state. For instance, optional eco-labeling has had an effect on 
some business sectors. Brazil is particularly susceptible to foreign 
                                                 
10 PM10 refers to fine suspended particles less than 10 microns in diameter which 
enters the respiratory tract and causes severe health problems, main source is from 
industrial pollution. 
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pressure because export industries must meet the environmental 
requirements of foreign states which are higher than Brazil’s own (Jha, 
Markandya, Vossenaar 1999, 104). 
 In 1992 Brazil hosted the United Nation’s Conference on 
Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro. The hosting 
of this conference was evidence, according to Hochstetler and Mumme 
(1998), that the New Republic’s view of environmental policy is different 
from the authoritarian period (46). Prior to the Rio conference President 
Collor de Mello placed great emphasis on environmental protection, going 
so far as to appoint Jose Lutzemberger to the post of Environmental 
Secretariat despite military objections (Rocha, the Guardian London). 
Mello’s concern for the environment is in sharp contrast to his 
predecessor Jose Sarney who stated “let pollution come, provided that it 
brings industries with it” (Quoted in Feeney 1992). 
 According to Roberto Guimaraes, a former Minister of the 
Environment stated “environmental planning lacks relevance” and “every 
public enterprise has a cosmetic and powerless environmental unit that 
creates environmental impact statements, which are generally ignored” 
(Quoted in Peritore 1999, 123). While environmental protection is a 
stated goal of the Brazilian state environmental bureaucracies have been 
constructed to create deadlock on the issue (Chapter 6). Peritore has 
interviewed an executive in Embrapa who claims Embrapa, which is in 
charge of sustainable development policy, was placed under the direction 
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of the Ministry of Agriculture to ensure conservation efforts would be 
slow to emerge (121). Government agencies thus work against 
environmental protection ensuring that protection goals will not be met. 
 Costa Rica is not as bio-diverse nor does it maintain the mineral 
resource wealth of Brazil, in fact no state does. However, Costa Rica does 
contain an approximated 4 percent of total world terrestrial biodiversity. 
Costa Rica, which is roughly the size of West Virginia, has more bird 
species than the entire United States. The territory consists of dry forests 
in the North West, rainforests in the region Corcovado, and contains 
approximately 8,000 species of plants (Steinberg 2001, 50). So while 
Costa Rica may not be endowed with the natural beauty of Brazil it more 
endowed relative to most states, just not Brazil. Costa Rica has been 
among the leading states in the area of ecotourism which has proven a 
great incentive to protect its commons. Costa Rica is also home to some 
of the most environmentally concerned citizens in Latin America 
(Brockett & Gottfried 2002, 8). Environmental degradation was prevalent 
in Costa Rica prior to the current democratic regime and has continued. 
The environmental movement which began in the 1960s gained influence 
as a result of the state’s investment in schools and research.  
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Table 3.2: Environmental Indicators in Costa Rica 
Year CO2 PM10 NOX FOREST PROTECT GDP/Capita MILITARY 
1980 1.05         3184.06   
1981 0.93         3026.51   
1982 0.84         2728.63   
1983 0.83         2729.49   
1984 0.76         2819.53   
1985 0.84         2771.88   
1986 0.94         3002.78   
1987 0.97         3074.25   
1988 1.01         3114.16 … 
1989 0.98         3116 … 
1990 0.95 45.13 3440 50.22 18.88 3319.65 … 
1991 1.05 42.81     20.53 3481.04 … 
1992 1.16 45.2     20.83 3558.32 … 
1993 1.19 43.24     20.83 3607.72 … 
1994 1.54 42.4     20.83 3549.28 … 
1995 1.4 41.43 3420   21 3653.38 … 
1996 1.33 44.41     21 3862.01 … 
1997 1.36 36.82     21 4079.56 … 
1998 1.42 37.88     21 4058.88 … 
1999 1.44 36.61     21 4015.13 … 
2000 1.41 33.72 2910 46.53 21 4048.09 … 
2001 1.4 32.73     23.05 4225.31 … 
2002 1.38 38.74     23.25 4327.37 … 
2003 1.55 41.8     23.25   … 
2004 1.51 39.11     23.25   … 
2005   36.96 2850 46.83     … 
Source: All data comes from the World Development Indicators except Protected land 
which comes from the United Nations Statistics Division 
 
 
The social tranquility of the state led foreign researchers interested 
in the tropics to conduct their research within Costa Rica. These 
researchers assisted in the establishment of educational facilities, 
training staff, and promoted conservation initiatives (Barbosa 2000, 143; 
Esposito 2002, 65; Steinberg 2001, 54). Costa Rican’s have a high 
literacy rate which has helped build awareness of environmental 
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sensitivity. The state has even placed conservation awareness in school 
curricula (Martin 2004, 164). In 1969, the General Forestry Directorate 
(DGF) was created within the Ministry of Agriculture and placed in 
charge of the national parks, establishing protected zones, and 
regulating recreational activities on the land. Since that time the state 
has created a new autonomous agency to oversee all conservation 
projects where the DGF now resides (Brockett & Gottfried 2002, 17). 
Separate agencies have prevented the marginalization of environmental 
impact statements as has happened in Brazil. 
Table 3.2 shows that, for the most part, Costa Rica has lower 
pollution levels than Brazil. The two exceptions to this are PM10 
emissions and forest area as a percentage of total area. The latter 
category is the result of an inability to deforest the land. Brazil has 
attempted to convert large areas of the Amazon but it has been too costly 
in lives. International attention to this area, coupled with indigenous 
demands, has prevented deforestation. Second, high rates of 
deforestation in the Amazon and Atlantic forests could result in parity 
between the two soon. A closer look at this indicator shows that in 1990 
Brazil maintained 61.47 percent of its forest area. This dropped to 58.3 
percent in 2000 and to 56.46 percent in 2005. This compares to Costa 
Rica which had 50.22 percent in 1990 dropped to 46.53 percent in 2000 
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and rose in 2005 to 46.83 percent.11 This shows that deforestation rates 
in Costa Rica have tapered off in recent years but have continued to rise 
in Brazil. The data show that Costa Rica currently has less forest area 
than Brazil but that could change in the coming decades. PM10 levels 
have dropped much more rapidly in Brazil than in Costa Rica which 
shows that given proper incentives Brazil can enact change. 
 Another effort to protect the environment in Costa Rica has been 
investment in alternative energy sources (Martin 2004, 162; Sanchez-
Azofeifa et al 2002, 410). Deadlines and goals have been set to decrease 
the state’s dependence on fossil fuels and move toward hydrogen power. 
The state is engaged in the Kyoto Protocol’s “carbon trading” program 
whereby a reduction in one state’s emissions can be bought by another 
state. The money earned from the program has been used to compensate 
individuals who have lost land as a result of protection zones and to fund 
sustainable forestry (Borges-Mendez 2008, 373). Costa Rica has been 
more willing to engage in international assistance programs than Brazil. 
A prime example is debt for nature swaps. Brazil has refused to engage 
in such programs labeling them as imperialism whereas Costa Rica has 
embraced the proposal (Barbosa 2000, 143). Costa Rica has also been 
one of the leading developing states in joint implementation initiatives 
proposed by the United Nations. This program assists in the 
implementation of conservation projects which involve the state, foreign 
                                                 
11 Albeit this rise could likely fall within the margins of error which I was not able to 
find in World Development Indicators database. 
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states, multi-national companies (MNCs), and environmental non-
governmental organizations (ENGOs). An example of joint initiatives is 
the ENGO Foundation for the Development of the Central Volcanic Range 
(FUNDECOR). The creation of this ENGO was sponsored by the state but 
was never under state supervision. The organization has fostered 
relationships between land squatters, private businesses, and public 
agencies instructing each as to the proper maintenance of the land. 
FUNDECOR has helped inform people how land preservation can 
generate money. Among the programs started by FUNDECOR are 
certification of “green” wood, the wood futures market, timber auctioning, 
and carbon trading schemes. Other strictly preventive assistance has 
been showing companies how to preserve watersheds, and minimize soil 
pollutants and waste (Borges-Mendez 2008, 376). Costa Rica has been at 
the forefront of innovative policy initiatives such as payments for 
environmental services where the state pays firms and/or individuals to 
incorporate conservation efforts in their business practices (Pagiola 
2002).  
Barbosa (2000) attributes Costa Rica’s conservation efforts to its 
longevity as a democracy and Brazil’s unsuccessful conservation efforts 
to being an infant democracy (141). This overlooks the ability of each 
state to protect the environment. Costa Rica’s political institutions are 
more amenable to reform and the bureaucracy more effective at policy 
implementation. Most conservation efforts have problems. The important 
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difference is the ability to learn from mistakes and correct errors. For 
this reason environmental protection is more guaranteed with a political 
system amenable to reform. The political structure of Costa Rica allows 
for reform whereas Brazil’s institutions are not receptive to change.  
Political Institutions 
The Executive 
 
The Brazilian executive was intentionally made weak under the 
1988 constitution and the Costa Rican president weakened under the 
1949 constitution (Meade 2003; Booth 1998). This was done to prevent 
too much power concentrated in the hands of a single individual. Both 
have a history of an executive gaining too much control over state 
resources which led to political conflicts. Formal powers aside the, Costa 
Rican and Brazilian executive have become stronger relative to the 
legislature in recent decades as a result of informal powers. 
 The executives in both have become stronger in recent decades as 
a result of being the source of policy initiation. The fragmented party 
system (discussed further below) has hampered the ability of the 
Brazilian legislature to formulate policy whereas the constitutional ban 
on immediate re-election for legislators in Costa Rica limits sustained 
policy expertise in the legislature. Mainwaring (1997) identifies three 
types of powers delegated to the Brazilian executive: reactive legislative 
powers, proactive legislative powers, and the ability to shape the 
legislative agenda (60). Reactive powers allow presidents to veto or 
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partially veto legislation, but given the relatively minimal amount of 
legislation passed by Congress it matters little. Proactive powers refer to 
the ability of presidents to govern by decree. This allows any presidential 
decree to have the force of law for 30 days, unless Congress acts. 
Environmental protection requires expert policy making, diligent 
attention, consistent policy, and sufficient material resources which is 
unattainable under a 30 day presidential decree.  
 The executive in Costa Rica has similar powers but has not had to 
rely on them. Like Brazil, much policy begins with the executive. Unlike 
the Brazilian president, the Costa Rican president can introduce 
legislation without sponsorship. The shift in power to the Costa Rican 
executive has been aptly described by Booth as “the executive not only 
carries out the law but increasingly makes it as the assembly retreats 
from key policy areas” (1998, 63).  
This is not to say the executive is unchecked. If a legislator or a 
cabinet member objects to an action or piece of legislation, the Supreme 
Court of Justice may immediately review the situation and overturn it. 
No damage to persons or property is necessary to provoke a review. 
Another restriction on the executive is the quasi autonomous nature of 
his cabinet. In order for the executive to veto a piece of legislation he 
needs the support of the cabinet member in charge of the legislation 
affected, which may not be forthcoming. Furthermore, cabinet members 
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are the individuals with the greatest expertise and may serve an 
indefinite period of time, and as a result are not easily discarded.  
An important informal power of the executive in Costa Rica is the 
role of party leader.  This derives from the centralized nature of the 
political system. This allows the executive to have much control over 
state resources and high level positions in the bureaucracy. Brazil has a 
federal system but the regional governors act as party leaders for their 
region. Governors in Brazil control nominations, alliances, and the 
resources needed for election (Samuels 2000, 16). For this reason 
legislators in Brazil heed the demands of regional governors over the 
executive. For this reason greater concern is given to regional loyalties 
and issues. 
The executive in Costa Rica has what Cox and Morgenstern (2001) 
call a “workable” environment; this is when the government is split 
between parties but both are willing to negotiate and compromise over 
policy. The executive has some authority over the legislature in terms of 
financing, but no control over the legislative agenda (Aleman 2006). 
When a majority is not in place, the executive still has the support of his 
party members who are able to place issues on the agenda. In contrast to 
Brazil the Costa Rican executive maintains control over his party. 
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The Legislature 
 
The relationship between the executive and the legislature is of 
great importance as well. Cox and Morgenstern (2002) identify four types 
of legislatures. Only two are important for this analysis. Brazil would be 
considered a “recalcitrant” majority and Costa Rica would be considered 
a “workable” majority (173). Brazilian presidents have rarely maintained 
a legislative majority and have had to cope with a legislature un-
beholden to anyone. In Costa Rica there are two main parties which 
compete and as a result are more cooperative. A clear example of the 
suitability of the aforementioned titles is the dependence of executives on 
their unilateral powers. The Brazilian executive has had to rely chiefly 
upon his decree making authority (which expires in 30 days) while the 
Costa Rican executive has not resorted to unilateral powers. For this 
reason the Costa Rican executive creates policy with the preferences of 
opposition candidates in mind and drafts policies with the intent of 
legislative reaction.  
Mainwaring and Scully (1995) claim political parties “put order into 
what would otherwise be a cacophony of dissonant conflicts” (3). Most 
scholars agree that parties are useful for the consolidation of democracy. 
Parties aggregate social interests, regularize the political process, and 
serve as an institution for compromise and representation; Brazilian 
parties have not served these functions though (Desposato 2006, 62). 
Brazil is a classic example of what Karl (1990) calls a “transition from 
 47
above.” The Brazilian transition took place with no economic crisis, 
political opposition, or military defeat. Rather the military began 
liberalization as a way to control the political system that would emerge 
(Stepan 1989, ix). A clear example of the military’s attempt to keep the 
transition under their control is the dismemberment of the opposition 
party into numerous weaker parties (Skidmore 1989, 22). This in effect 
weakened the opposition and strengthened the party favored by the 
military. This has had deleterious effects for the new democracy. The 
Brazilian military, with the support of President Sarney, ensured that a 
presidential system would emerge. This was done to guarantee Sarney’s 
continued powers which he would use to protect the military (Linz and 
Stepan 1996, 169). The legislature has many powers associated with a 
parliamentary system and as a result has led to gridlock in the legislative 
process. The current political system was further embedded in the 1988 
constitution which maintained the pre-existing electoral structure of 
open-list proportional representation. This procedure weakens the party 
and strengthens the individual. Parties are further weakened by electoral 
laws. Laws require parties to place an incumbent on their ticket 
regardless of party discipline (Ames 1999, 141). These factors have led to 
fragmented parties. Power and Roberts (1995) have argued that the 
electoral process has proven too confusing for the average voter. 
Mainwaring and Perez-Linan (1997) have shown that Brazil lacks party 
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discipline which prevents coalitions from forming and places the 
consolidation of Brazilian democracy in question.  
For instance WVS data show the public want increased civilian 
spending as opposed to military spending but this occurs only 
sporadically (Lebovic 2001, 450) possibly as a result of political pacts 
agreed to during the transitional phase (Karl 1990). Mainwaring (1992) 
points to four factors which have prevented strong parties from emerging. 
First, income inequality and lack of information has prevented informed 
voting. Second, regulatory power is concentrated within the bureaucracy. 
Third, the combination of a weak presidency and undisciplined parties 
has led to legislative gridlock. Finally, the Brazilian political class has 
opted for weak parties (678). In Brazil a major problem is that the state 
controls the parties by controlling party affiliation, voting behavior of 
representatives, and most importantly by ensuring or denying access to 
jobs, resources, promotions, and favors (ibid, 681). This grants state 
officials leverage over legislators which in turn leads to compromised 
politicians. Ames (1999) goes on to say that political institutions create 
incentives that weaken parties and encourage politicians to enrich 
themselves or to focus on pork barrel legislation (131). Desposato (2006) 
shows that Brazilian legislators switch parties to maximize pork barreling 
and short term electoral concerns. The segmentalist organization of 
Brazilian society also hinders the importance of political parties (Weyland 
1996, 44). This occurs because lobby groups direct resources to 
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bureaucrats and can bypass parties to achieve their goals. This is 
possible because once appointed bureaucrats no longer have allegiance 
to the individual that placed them in power. This is in contradiction of 
Geddes’ requirement that bureaucracies must be held accountable. The 
inability to remove bureaucrats weakens the ability of the state to 
function properly. 
The disillusionment of the populace with regards to political 
parties is apparent in the WVS of 2005. Twenty percent of respondents 
claim they have “a great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in the parties. 
In short, the citizenry is aware that parties do not represent their interest 
which partly explains low political participation throughout the country. 
Mainwaring concludes that most politicians see parties “as vehicles for 
getting elected, not as organizations to which they owe an attachment” 
(688). It is the continued weakness of parties that has allowed business 
associations to maintain their control of policy making and enforcement. 
Mainwaring and Scully (2008) put forth four characteristics of effective 
political parties: stable party competition, voter attachment to parties, 
party legitimacy, and party solidarity (119). It is clear that Brazil achieves 
none of these characteristics. When parties are weak it enables the 
traditional elite to “capture” the policy making process. The party system 
has caused several problems even for self-proclaimed environmentalists. 
In 1982, three environmentalists were elected to state and local office but 
soon came into conflict with the environmental groups that got them 
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elected because they had to comprise on issues (Hochstetler and Mumme 
1998, 49). 
The Costa Rican legislature is more straightforward. In short, 
political parties matter and party discipline is adhered to. This makes it 
easier to legislate and react quickly to potential problems. Since Costa 
Rican independence there have been two factions in social life – the 
conservatives and the liberals. The two national parties are the National 
Liberation Party (PLN) and Social Christian Unity Party (PUSC) which 
have been dominant since democracy re-emerged. The 1949 Costa Rican 
constitution does not allow immediate re-election of legislators and 
provides for proportional representation which should undermine the 
strength of political parties. However, parties have maintained influence 
over legislators because, unlike Brazil, voters vote for the party not the 
individual.12 This demonstrates the importance of party platform. Parties 
have been able to maintain influence over legislators because most 
legislators want re-election or a post in the president’s cabinet (Taylor 
1992). In a survey of Costa Rican legislators Taylor (1992) found that the 
second most important part of a legislators’ job is to perform 
constituency service on behalf of the party (1061). In Costa Rica a 
cabinet position is considered a promotion and is highly desirable. A 
second incentive to adhere to party discipline is appointment to the 
                                                 
12 This is not the case for the executive though. Party preference only matters to the 
legislature. When polled voters claim executive ideology and personality were more 
important than party allegiance. See Booth 1998, 70. 
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standing committees. The most important is the finance committee 
which makes it easier for legislators to deliver pork to their district. This 
committee is wholly dominated by the party in power and access is only 
granted to individuals who adhere to party principles. Again, unlike 
Brazil, parties are capable evicting individuals from their party, which 
effectively retires that person from politics (Carey 2003, 200). 
The Supreme Electoral Tribunal subsidizes the costs for elections 
in Costa Rica. This allows legislators to be independent of regional 
governors and pursue the interests of society as a whole. This is in sharp 
contrast with Brazil where legislators are loyal to regional governors, not 
the national party. This is not the case in Costa Rica. The national 
committee, or the executive, maintains control over national electoral 
resources. Reimbursement regulations also ensure that national parties 
continue in power. To be reimbursed a party must win at least 5 percent 
of the national vote. This subsidy allows equal footing between the two 
parties because neither party becomes beholden to special interest 
groups. 
The differences between party discipline in Brazil and Costa Rica is 
what has led to the differences in policy output. Party discipline is non-
existent in Brazil which is why little gets accomplished. Party discipline 
is strong in Costa Rica which makes the policy process and 
implementation of policy more efficient. The multitude of parties in Brazil 
has led to party labels having little significance. 
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The Bureaucracy 
 
Another important distinction is the bureaucratic recruitment 
systems. Costa Rica has been more effective at enacting policy while 
Brazil has made little progress in enacting reform (Meade 2003; Weyland 
1996). Geddes (1990) identifies three prerequisites for good state 
bureaucracy: expertise, efficient concentration of scarce resources 
(funding), and a bureaucracy committed to achieve its goals (218). 
 When speaking of efficiency the reference is to “state capacity” 
which is the ability of states to “have the capacity, in terms of 
organizational cohesion, expertise, and extractive and coercive ability, to 
carry out decisions based on their preferences” (Geddes 1990, 217). State 
capacity varies among nations. The economically developed West has 
much greater capacity than states in the global South. The reasons for 
lack of state capacity vary. Among the reasons is a lack of information, 
experienced delegates, and/or technical experts (Chasek 2001). State 
capacity will also affect how representative a state will be. Without 
capacity states will be unable to respond to citizen demands. For this 
reason a measure of state capacity can also serve as a proxy of 
representativeness.  
 Weyland (1996) identifies three forms of organization: personalism, 
segmentalism, and universalism (32-37). Universalism is typified by a 
bureaucracy that puts the interests of the state before its own and views 
the entire citizenry as its constituency. Segmentalism is when the 
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bureaucracy responds to a narrow group and its demands. The final 
category is personalism, or clientelism, whereby bureaucrats sell their 
services to the highest bidder. The latter two pose problems for collective 
action. Environmental projects are particularly susceptible. These 
projects depend on few people relative to labor movements. The clientelist 
category typifies Brazil. Ames claims Brazil has the “worst” civil service of 
any state in Latin America (1999, 132). Costa Rica will be shown to be 
universalist. 
Brazil has a federal system which delegates environmental powers 
to the local, state, and national level. Policy making power is within the 
realm of bureaucracies not centralized (Back and Hadenius 2008). 
National resources, principally funding, are not in the hands of the 
executive. Rather, it lies within congress which is fragmented, again 
contrary to what is prescribed. As a result of income inequality the public 
is generally ill informed and easily misled. Participation is limited to the 
election of officials most of which the public has no confidence (WVS 
2005). Grassroots organizations lack the material resources to petition 
the state so they become co-opted to ensure regulations are enforced, 
unintentionally becoming subordinate to state demands (Foweraker 
2001, 850). Brazil lacks state capacity because the executive is weak and 
cannot enforce regulations, Congress is weak because it is highly 
fractionalized as a result of multiple parties, no party discipline, and the 
bureaucracy has traditionally been clientelistic oriented. Brazil does not 
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have the ability to create and enforce environmental reform principally as 
a result of the large amount of powers delegated to the legislature and 
the fragmented party system. The legislature prevents the executive from 
pursuing an agenda. The legislature is unable or unwilling to keep the 
bureaucracy from lining its pockets and is incapable of passing 
meaningful legislation. 
An important part of Geddes (1990) and Chasek (2001) is an 
autonomous and expert bureaucracy making informed decisions. 
However, across Latin America, especially Brazil, the main influence 
political parties have is the appointment of bureaucrats and policy 
makers (Mainwaring 1992, 684). Appointments, however, are not based 
on merit. They are the result of political necessity. Reid et al (2006) 
examines the role of bureaucrats in regulating fisheries in Brazil. They 
conclude that most of the agencies lack qualified personnel and many 
bureaucracies are in charge of regulating the same problem, but have 
different agendas (Reid et al 2006, 271). What further hinders state 
capacity is the Brazilian constitution grants life tenure to bureaucrats 
(Ames 1999, 132). Referring to Geddes’ three requisites of state capacity: 
expertise, sufficient resources, and bureaucrats performing to keep their 
job; it is noticeable that none are met in Brazil. This feature has been 
present since the beginning of Brazilian democracy. Guimaraes (2002) 
goes so far as to say that “civil service” in Brazil means “to serve one’s 
own interest,” not the public (233).  
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 President Sarney, the first president13 of the new republic, was 
forced to respond to traditional clientelistic demands (Mainwaring 1986, 
173). The claim by Weyland (1996) that “organizational fragmentation” 
prevents economic reform equally applies to environmental reform (4). 
The close connection between state agencies and business groups; 
coupled with the fragmentation of society gives the bureaucracy a certain 
degree of autonomy which precludes environmental protection reforms 
from emerging. In short, even though a move to democracy has taken 
place, the institutional structure of the Brazilian state has not changed 
much (Mainwaring 1986).  
The Costa Rican bureaucracy has constitutional guarantees for its 
funding while in Brazil the budget is in constant flux (Booth 1998, 64). 
This restricts the ability of Brazilian bureaucrats to make long term 
plans. The guarantee of funding is fundamental for environmental 
protection. Conservation efforts require long term investment and 
oversight which is difficult to achieve with funding variation. 
It has also been shown that meritocratic recruitment, one of the 
most important prerequisites for state capacity, has been met in Costa 
Rica and not in Brazil14 (Panizza 2001). In Brazil, the executive makes 
appointments to those who will provide him support in the legislature. 
                                                 
13 Jose Sarney was the first president of the new republic. However, he was not elected 
he assumed office with the unexpected death of Tancredo Neves the directly elected 
president, Jose Sarney was the Vice Presidential candidate. 
14 This is the process whereby applicants for a position are hired based on their 
qualifications not as a result of who they know. 
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This means giving jobs to people who are not necessarily qualified. The 
Costa Rican executive can appoint and remove ministers from their post 
without legislative approval but the expertise of these officials along with 
the short time of the executive has made removal a rarely used option. 
Furthermore, appointment of these officials is staggered and overlaps 
executive administrations (Hughes & Mijeski 1984, 90-91). This means 
the executive does not get the administration of his choice rather he 
inherits an administration and modifies it with time. This allows for a 
diversity of views and a continuation of policy from one administration to 
the next. 
Autonomy is essential to protect bureaucrats from undue political 
interference in policy implementation. For this reason Costa Rica has 
nearly 200 autonomous administrative agencies which increase capacity 
and protects bureaucrats from political manipulation (Booth 1998, 400). 
Rosenburg (1984) has noted that corruption within the social security 
bureaucracy has not been tolerated (120). Rather emphasis has been 
given to gaining legitimacy from the public so expertise has been an 
overriding concern in Costa Rica. This would clearly place Costa Rica 
within Weyland’s “universalist” category (1996). The preceding would 
make it seem that the Costa Rican bureaucracy can be easily influenced 
by elites for they have too much autonomy thus violating one of Geddes’ 
(1990) prerequisites of a bureaucracy subject to removal for poor 
performance. This has not been the case for three reasons. First, the 
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budget is still within the purview of the legislature. The legislature 
cannot reduce funds but can choose to not increase funds for other 
projects. Second, performance has been rewarded within the 
bureaucracy via promotions and amenities. Lastly, pay within the public 
sector has been higher than that in the private sector which helps to 
keep bureaucrats loyal to the state (Panizza 2001, 143). 
Civil Society 
 Civil society in Brazil is weak as a result of an inability to build 
strong coalitions and effectively pressure the state (Encarnacion 2003). 
However, the weakness of civil society is a result of the institutions in 
place. Civil society organizations are well financed and organized but the 
fragmented system in place prevents effective pressure.  
It is expected that civil society groups provide an alternative to 
political parties to have their interests represented (Diamond 1994, 8). 
However, as a result of political patronage in the bureaucracy and severe 
economic inequality the bureaucracy is not responsive to civil society 
groups. Civil society groups have lacked discipline and connections to 
political parties to be effective at pushing an environmental agenda 
(Foweraker 2001, 850). The fragmented party system makes it difficult to 
rally legislatures to a particular cause and the lack of party discipline 
forces civil society to appeal to a wide range of individuals. Certain civil 
society groups do benefit from the fragmented system by following the 
clientelistic actions of business associations (Encarnacion 2003, 129). 
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This has, however, resulted in the lack of cohesion among civil society 
groups and results in free riders, lack of collective action, and  mistrust 
(ibid, 129). Political patronage prevents bureaucrats from being removed 
from office especially since most appointments are made by individual 
congressional members not the party (Mainwaring 1992, 684). Diamond 
is correct in pointing to the benefits that civil society can provide, but the 
importance of political parties which do engage in the political process is 
superior to civil society (Mainwaring 1999, 332). Another problem is 
environmental policy is highly technical, requires expertise, and needs 
financial resources which many grassroots groups do not have 
(Hochstetler and Mumme 1998, 38). It could be claimed that people are 
more interested in economic development as opposed to environmental 
protection. However, Jacobs (2002) effectively shows that despite 
widespread poverty there is no significant difference between Brazil and 
European states with regards to environmental issues. In the study 
Jacobs compares group participation in environmental cleanup projects 
and awareness, as measured by the Euro barometer and Latino 
barometer, and finds no significant difference.  
 Environmental groups are the civil society of most importance to 
this study, but while environmentalist have a long history in Brazil they 
have not been effective. Environmental movements are typically seen as 
unified and homogenous which may not be true. In Brazil environmental 
groups in the various regions differ on strategies and concession making 
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(Hochstetler 1997, 204). It is reported by Hochstetler that international 
environmental groups have had difficulty finding partners in the Amazon 
because environmental groups are fragmented and not cohesive (214). As 
a result they have had to seek support from the Rubber Tappers and 
union leaders in the region. This is especially true for protection of the 
Amazon. Foreign environmental groups worked with Chico Mendes’ 
movement to prevent the encroachment of ranchers into the forests. 
Mendes’ movement has been used as a model but it neglects the 
contextual factors that made the movement a relative success. Keck 
(1995) points to the murder of Chico Mendes and the salience of 
environmental protection at the time as factors which were influential. 
These factors may not be present for other movements (420). Civil society 
groups have not had much influence because resources are highly 
concentrated in the state bureaucracy, which is inaccessible to most 
environmental groups (Guimaras 2002, 231-232).  
 Costa Rica has an institutional structure more open to pressure 
from civil society groups. The party system and party discipline have 
made it easier to pressure legislators. Like Brazil, much of the money 
that sustains these organizations comes from foreign donors. These 
donors are only interested in protecting the rainforest, as is the case with 
Brazil. Localized air pollution and improving urban waste management 
has not been of importance to foreign donors (Quiros 2003, 135). ENGOs 
have traditionally worked with the state to get environmental projects 
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underway and provide oversight to ensure policies enacted are effective 
(Tahkokallio & Nygren 2008, 348). Like Brazilian groups, Costa Rican 
environmentalists have sought the assistance and cooperation of those 
affected by environmental policy. A defining feature of these groups, 
compared to Brazilian groups, is their aversion to engaging in politics 
(ibid 2008, 347; Steinberg 2001 84-86). The reluctance of ENGOs to 
engage in the political process has restricted their concerns to 
international issues which neglects pollution that adversely affects the 
local population.  
Civil society groups have been much more effective in Costa Rica 
than in Brazil. The emphases of both have been on international 
concerns not of the local population. This has restricted their ability to 
gain the loyalty of the local population. All the same, civil society groups 
do provide an invaluable function that Payne (1995) and Diamond (1994) 
predict. The theoretical fault of Payne and Diamond come from not 
examining the institutions in which actors must engage. Brazil does not 
maintain institutions open to change nor are they easily accessible. 
Costa Rica has an open system which is why civil society groups have 
been more effective. For this reason the institutional setting is of superior 
importance than the strength of civil society. 
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Conclusions 
An important distinction between the two states is the absence of a 
military in Costa Rica. Military expenditures average 1.9 percent of GDP 
across Latin America15. This allows Costa Rica to invest in social projects 
whereas Brazil continues to spend large sums for national security. 
Costa Rica has degraded its environment and had one of the highest 
deforestation rates in the world (Pagiola 2002, 38). However, the state 
has been remedying the negative externalities of economic development. 
Costa Rica has been able to learn from its experiences at environmental 
reform and adjust accordingly; while Brazil maintains a deeply 
entrenched system which is not amenable to reform. The fragmented 
party system in Brazil has hurt all efforts at environmental reform. This 
is in contrast to the strong federal system in place in Costa Rica. Costa 
Rica also maintains an independent meritocratic based bureaucracy 
which serves the interest of the nation as a whole. The opposite is true of 
the Brazilian bureaucracy, which is headed by patronage appointments 
and a dearth of expertise in environmental management. 
Environmental protection in Costa Rica can easily be attributed to 
the revenue generating industry ecotourism. This, however, would 
neglect the decade’s long movement toward environmental protection 
which preceded the emergence of this industry. It was not until the mid 
1980s when ecotourism became a success in Costa Rica (Steinberg 2001, 
                                                 
15 Brazil averages 1.8 percent of gross domestic product 
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76). This was four decades after the roots of environmental protection 
had been planted and two decades after it began to receive international 
recognition for its efforts.  
In summary, the term democracy is a contested concept. The term 
can more easily be understood when making the distinction between 
procedural democracy and representative democracy. The former has 
democratically elected officials and the rule of law prevails. However, the 
system itself fails to reflect the interests of the masses they represent. 
The latter maintains democratically elected officials, the rule of law, and 
reflects the interests of the masses. When democratic theorists declare 
the benefits of democracy the distinction should be made between 
procedural and representative democracy. Brazil falls under the category 
of procedural democracy and Costa Rica under representative 
democracy. A transition to procedural democracy can occur without a 
transfer of power away from the traditional governing class.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
CHILE AND GUATEMALA 
As has been argued there are two necessities for environmental 
protection: 1) the resources and 2) the desire to protect the environment. 
Chile’s institutional structure strengthens the executive and minimizes 
the ability of the legislature to heed the demands of civil society which 
results in lackluster environmental performance. While Chile does 
protect the environment more so than Brazil it does so simply to ensure 
good relations with its trading partners in the event of a free trade pact 
requiring such protection. It will be shown that because the legislature is 
not an avenue to petition for environmental protection the only recourse 
is the executive. The executive maintains control over the state 
bureaucracy and the budget. It is the prerogative of the executive to 
enforce the law; if he chooses to ignore the environment there is little 
that can be done to compel enforcement. State capacity is not lacking in 
Chile. The staff and resources are available but the limited desire to 
protect the environment has led to half-hearted policies.  
As of 2003 Chile was still considered by some to be in a 
transitional phase (Aguero 2003). Garreton (2000) claims Chile is a 
consolidated semi-democracy but not many observers suggest Chile is a 
full fledged democracy. Among the reasons for this are the constraints 
imposed upon the current regime as a result of the drafting of the 
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constitution prior to the demise of the dictator Augusto Pinochet. The 
military is allowed to appoint nine senators who can prevent the 
legislature from overriding executive vetoes. The Chilean president is 
debatably the most powerful of all executives in Latin America. The 
disproportionate power granted to the executive is the result of 
manipulations by Pinochet who thought he would be elected to the 
presidency (Siavelis 1997). However, this study begins with the 
assumption that Chile is a democracy for all indices categorize Chile as a 
democracy since 1990. However, the limitations that Garreton 
emphasizes have restricted the ability of the state to perform many 
functions so the ability of the state to represent the will of the people is 
questionable. President Lagos (2000-2006) outlined seven “great reforms” 
that would modernize the country none had any provisions for 
environmental protection (Aguero 2003, 318). During the authoritarian 
rule of Pinochet most avenues of expression were silenced. 
Environmental concerns were not among those silenced as a result the 
environmental movement garnered support among a diverse populace, 
but this community died when it no longer had a common cause (Silva 
1996, 9; Carruthers 2001, 345). Carruthers (2001) points to the 
movement fading as the result of lackluster gains in environmental 
protection. He claims the end of dictatorship has resulted in the 
departure of environmental experts to positions within the state. This, 
however, is a good thing for it is experts that are needed to make 
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informed policy decisions. An examination of the influence of experts in 
the policy process is of more importance. The problem hurting Chilean 
environmental policy is the asymmetrical nature of the policy process. 
The executive yields many powers typically reserved for the legislature 
and maintains a significantly larger staff than does the legislature as a 
whole. This allows the executive to be more informed and draft legislation 
that tends to the needs of a particular sector. This reduces the number of 
avenues available to ENGOs can attempt to influence policy. 
Guatemala is among the poorest states in Latin America hence 
state capacity is immediately questionable. The average per capita 
income for the time period under consideration is USD 1,568; far less 
than the average for Chile USD 3,652. In addition, income distribution is 
much less skewed in Chile than in Guatemala. These two factors would 
lead us to believe that Chilean demands for environmental protection 
would be greater than in Guatemala. Guatemalans responding to the 
Latino Barometer consistently placed environmental protection ahead of 
economic development with a low of 52 percent in 1996 and a high of 66 
percent in 1997. Chileans also favored environmental protection over 
economic development with a low of 66 percent in 1995 and a high of 80 
percent in 1996. In addition Guatemalans, unlike Chileans, were willing 
to be taxed to pay for environmental protection (63 percent in favor); 
whereas only 22 percent of Chileans were willing to pay the necessary 
taxes. It is interesting that Guatemalans prefer environmental protection 
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to economic growth due to the lack of material wealth for most persons. 
Guatemala makes an interesting case because it is not categorized as a 
democracy by most indices; rather it is considered semi-democratic at 
best. In contrast to Chile, the people of Guatemala favor environmental 
protection on roughly equal terms, but Guatemalans are willing to pay 
for such protection (despite the higher poverty rate in Guatemala), but 
Guatemala is not a democracy. This allows us to compare a democratic 
state with the capacity but not the will to protect the environment (Chile) 
with a non-democratic state that has the will but not the capacity to do 
so (Guatemala).  
The political system in place, similar to Chile, is the result of a pact 
between the military and representatives of the civilian population. The 
transition to democracy technically occurred in 1985 with the election of 
Vinicio Cerezo. However, the limitations placed upon the regime and the 
constant threat of military intervention restrained the governance of 
elected officials. Despite winning by a wide margin and U.S. support for 
his regime, the Christian Democrat Vinicio Cerezo did very little to 
change the priorities of the state (Jonas 1995, 30). This meant 
continuing the civil war which included the continued oppression of the 
Mayans (who incidentally account for at least 50 percent of the 
population) and the continued rule of the traditional elite. The transition 
to democracy did not mean a transfer of power. Instead, the transition 
involved the continuation of the military regime with a civilian president 
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(Jonas 1995, 29). All of this meant the environment along with all other 
social issues were a non factor. In fact the military leaders warned 
against any major reform efforts (Williams and Seri 2003, 321). In 
addition, the ability of political parties to participate in the electoral 
process was greatly restricted (Jonas 2001, 62).  
The military which ruled from 1954-1985 formally cannot be 
labeled efficient simply because its only prerogative was to quell any 
social unrest. The instability of the post Arbenz state is chronicled by 
Granados (1992) who states “one president was assassinated, two 
interim presidents were named, five government juntas were formed, one 
election was annulled, one presidential election was repeated, and one 
president elected through the mechanism of a coup d’etat was deposed 
(92).” This has continued with the semi-democratic state of today. The 
powers of each branch have been contested, stalemates have occurred, 
and the implementation of laws have been selective (Macias 1996, 147). 
Congress has been marked by vote buying and an executive which is 
corrupt. Guatemala has been cited by Transparency International as the 
third most corrupt state in all of Latin America (cited in Canache and 
Allison 2005, table 1). In short, all branches of the state are inefficient 
just as they were under authoritarian rule. In fact human rights 
violations are thought to have become worse under a pseudo-democratic 
regime (Trudeau 1993, 125). Military prerogatives remain supreme and 
any policy efforts which differ from its interests will not pass and will not 
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be enforced. This leads the evaluation of each branch of the Guatemalan 
state to focus on the restrictions placed upon it by the military. 
A Short Environmental History 
Chile has taken a market-friendly approach to environmental 
protection. This approach has not incorporated grassroots projects like 
that in Costa Rica (Silva 1997, 458). As a result conflict has been high 
over environmental policy because the indigenous populace has not been 
willing to go along with state programs.  Indeed the relationship between 
indigenous groups and foreign conservationists, these are people who 
purchase land with no intent of using it, has been tenuous at best (Meza 
2009). Environmental protection has not been high on the priority list for 
the Chilean state yet it has been a concern for the Chilean people. 
Responding to polls from Latino Barometer for the years 1995-1998 a 
majority of people favored environmental protection at the expense of 
slower growth. The lowest number in favor of the environment was 57 
percent in 1998 with a high of 80 percent in 1996. This is in large part a 
result of the economic success of the state. This success however has 
come at the expense of the environment which has been the development 
path followed for decades. Under the Pinochet regime the state followed a 
policy of resource led development. This policy has continued under the 
democratic regime with little change (Clapp 1998). Treasury Secretary 
Alejandro Foxley attributed Chile’s continued economic success to its 
resource endowments and reflects the overall sentiment that 
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diversification of the economy is not necessary; rather expansion of 
resource exploitation is (cited in Clapp 1998, 4). Much of Chile’s 
environmental problems arise from the demand on the environment. The 
fishing industry, forestry sector, mining, and the agricultural sector all 
boomed under authoritarian rule and this success has continued 
unabated. The consequent effects are an urban environment, water 
pollution, biodiversity is threatened, and over fishing is threatening 
salmon in the region (Silva 1996, 7). The development policy Chile has 
followed has relied on resources which have little or no value added. The 
industries have not required much human capital despite the state’s 
willingness to finance worker education programs. The industry and the 
state have ignored those who advocate moving toward products with 
higher-value added content, but stalemate has been reached as a result 
of the ideological commitment which prevails (Weyland 1999, 75).  
Attempts at environmental protection in Chile include the use of 
tree farming. This is a process whereby farmers plant non-native trees for 
export. This has led to a reduction in the deforestation of native species 
but the sustainability of the project is questionable. Clapp (2001) puts 
forth four requisites for sustainable forestry and Chile does not meet one 
of the requisites. The missing requirement is for managed forests lead to 
a reduction in demand for traditional markets. This has not occurred 
because the harvesting of native plant species is controlled by small 
farmers who do not have the resources necessary to engage in 
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sustainable forestry. Another reason for the failure of this program is the 
inability to know the exact conditions for successful forestry projects. 
The local farmers do not have the necessary capital to fund the research 
and the state is unwilling to expend the resources to make sustainable 
forestry feasible (Silva 1997, 468). Chile has also received praise for its 
“reduction” of PM10 emissions and CO2 emissions (Gunther et al 2002)16. 
This was another market based approach which sought to provide the 
proper incentives to polluting firms to voluntarily reduce emissions. 
There are two problems with this decree the first is a reduction in 
emissions is not a guarantee that pollution levels will increase.17 This is 
because a cap has not been placed upon emissions. Rather, firms are 
granted trading permits for the emissions that they are capable of 
emitting not for their actual emissions. A firm does not need to reduce its 
emissions in order for it to sell its potential emissions. It can sell 
emissions that it may have never reached. Therefore this is not an 
efficient way to reduce emissions nor is it a way to maintain emissions at 
the current level. Another problem is the potential for rent seeking 
behavior within the permit industry. Since caps are not set at the actual 
emissions level it is possible for bribery to occur so as to increase the 
                                                 
16 This is contrary to the data used in this study which shows increases in CO2 
emissions 
17 The emissions trading scheme is not law because it has not passed in the legislature 
rather the executive has issued  a decree which has the force of law since Congress did 
not act upon it. This will be elaborated upon when the powers of the executive are 
examined. 
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potential emissions to allow for greater trading of emissions that would 
not have otherwise occurred. 
Environmental policy is not new to Chile as attempts to protect 
forests have existed for some time. Prior to the 1973, coup protected 
areas were established to protect a slow growing tree, the Alerce species. 
This policy continued under Pinochet who declared the species a national 
monument and made it illegal to cut any of the trees dead or alive. 
However it was permissible to cut fallen trees which made enforcement 
difficult because it required someone to be caught in the act of felling the 
tree (Clapp 1998, 11). This policy has been extended to other tree species 
but the same exception has led to continued logging hence enforcement 
has been difficult to achieve. Furthermore, permits are needed to cut 
trees but enforcement has been lacking. The organization in charge of 
forest clearing is the National Forest Corporation (CONAF). As was the 
case with Brazil this group’s two primary mandates contradict each 
other. This group has a broad mandate and limited staff a characteristic 
all too common in environmental protection agencies. President Eduardo 
Frei has gone so far as to say “no environmental cause will stand in the 
way of development” (quoted in Clapp 1998, 24). This is opposed to what 
the majority of Chileans prefer according to the above cited polls by 
Latino Barometer.  Despite citizen requests for environmental protection, 
Chile has had an unimpressive record. Table 4.1 shows that on most 
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Table 4.1: Environmental Indicators for Chile 
Year CO2 NOX FOREST PM10 PROTECT MILITARY GDP/Capita 
1980 2.47           2501.4 
1981 2.19           2580.7 
1982 1.85           2278.36 
1983 1.89           2157.06 
1984 1.94           2291.17 
1985 1.82           2413.99 
1986 1.79           2507.05 
1987 1.84           2628.02 
1988 2.15         4.94 2772.81 
1989 2.57         4.08 3013.13 
1990 2.7 8170 20.38 87.88 13.44 4.16 3069.87 
1991 2.53     82.04 13.44 3.95 3255.22 
1992 2.6     76.5 13.44 3.72 3588.69 
1993 2.6     76.28 13.44 3.60 3770.54 
1994 2.95     75.38 13.55 3.37 3916.93 
1995 3.11 9430   71.26 13.82 3.06 4262.68 
1996 3.51     71.98 13.82 3.09 4509.15 
1997 3.97     70.14 13.82 3.21 4738.69 
1998 3.89     67.97 13.84 3.42 4826.38 
1999 4.16     69.78 13.84 3.68 4728.62 
2000 3.87 10990 21.15 62.51 13.84 3.70 4880.23 
2001 3.55     59.19 13.84 3.71 4985.36 
2002 3.64     60.47 13.84 3.81 5036.33 
2003 3.61     58.13 20.76 3.41 5176.06 
2004 3.87     54.98 20.76 3.80 5426.99 
2005   12590 21.53 53.12   3.72   
Source: All data comes from the World Development Indicators except Protected land 
which comes from the United Nations Statistics Division 
 
 
indicators environmental conditions have increasingly gotten worse, 
PM10 and protect are exceptions. This is despite the reduction in military 
spending and increased GDP/Capita. Both indicators would suggest a 
move toward more socially oriented programs. 
Interestingly enough Chile has renewed efforts to protect the 
environment as a result of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA). The free trade agreement among the three North American 
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states required certain environmental provisions mostly directed at 
Mexico. This, however, has shown Chile what conditions a free trade 
agreement with the U.S. will be included. For this reason the state has 
begun to take the environment more seriously (Silva 1996, 2). This is fine 
by the Chilean populace who in 2000 overwhelmingly (86 percent) 
supported the incorporation of environmental protection in any free trade 
agreement.  It has been shown that the Chilean people want 
environmental protection yet the state has been unwilling to expand 
environmental programs. Carruthers (2001) attributes the lack of 
environmental policy and enforcement on the state’s close ties and 
dependency upon the business sectors that profit from lax environmental 
regulations. However, another poll by Latino Barometer in 2001 shows 
that 77 percent of respondents would not want to pay higher taxes to 
protect the environment. It is, therefore, not just the business elite that 
do not want their flexibility taken away it is also the masses who do not 
want to make the necessary sacrifices to protect the environment. A final 
factor leading to the predominance of market-friendly environmental 
policies is the fear of military intervention for issues that would appear 
leftist (Linz & Stepan 1996, 205). Chile has shown a “bias toward risk-
aversion in the domain of gains” (Weyland 1999, 89).  In other words 
Chile has preferred the certainty of the status quo to the risk of changing 
anything within society. This sentiment is accurate of its approach to 
environmental protection. There has been continued environmental 
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protection but there has been little change in policies from the Pinochet 
years. The changes that have occurred prescribe gradual changes only to 
sectors that are relatively small relative to the overall economy.  
Environmental conditions in Guatemala have steadily gotten worse 
since 1980 on all indicators except protected area (see table 4.2). The 
ability of the state to protect this area is questionable given the low 
taxation rates and the lack of expertise in the bureaucracy to carry out 
regulations. Not only is there a dearth of expertise but the ability of the 
state to pass, let alone implement, regulations is restricted by military 
prerogatives. Deforestation has been a major issue in Guatemala not just 
for environmental degradation but also for the displacement of persons 
that has occurred as a result. The military followed a “scorched earth” 
policy up until 1996 (when the civil war ended) to weaken the guerillas. 
This resulted in land use changes and the displacement of people. These 
two factors led to an increase in cattle ranching, which further degraded 
the soil and the forced migration of indigenous people to the metropolitan 
areas which worsened air and water quality in urban areas. 
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Table 4.2: Environmental Indicators in Guatemala 
Year CO2 NOX FOREST PM10 PROTECT MILITARY GDP/Capita 
1980 0.64           1684.98 
1981 0.55           1654.51 
1982 0.49           1556.9 
1983 0.42           1479.66 
1984 0.44           1451.02 
1985 0.44           1407.96 
1986 0.45           1377.25 
1987 0.48           1393.53 
1988 0.48         1.59 1415.13 
1989 0.49         1.54 1437.88 
1990 0.57 4780 43.79 63.07 25.92 1.47 1449.11 
1991 0.55     64.22 25.92 1.08 1468.15 
1992 0.64     66.47 25.92 1.25 1504.26 
1993 0.59     61.54 25.92 1.08 1527.86 
1994 0.7     64.17 25.92 1.08 1553.61 
1995 0.72 5060   62.93 29.47 0.99 1593.93 
1996 0.65     59.45 30.1 0.82 1604.59 
1997 0.73     57.12 30.67 0.74 1637.55 
1998 0.82     61.3 30.73 0.72 1681.14 
1999 0.81     69.58 30.74 0.68 1706.52 
2000 0.91 7090 38.81 77.93 30.76 0.82 1727.56 
2001 0.92     77 30.76 1.05 1726.55 
2002 0.93     77.12 30.76 0.76 1723.53 
2003 0.88     69.13 30.76 0.82 1718.13 
2004 0.99     67.36 30.76 0.48 1721.42 
2005   7980 36.32 62.23   0.38   
Source: All data comes from the World Development Indicators except Protected land 
which comes from the United Nations Statistics Division 
 
 
Unlike Chile, conditions for foreign aid were not tied to 
improvements or enforcement of environmental regulations. Rather 
USAID was tied to improvements in human rights which assisted in the 
transition to democracy in 1985. Guatemala, just like Chile, depended 
upon its resource endowments (again at the behest of the U.S.) for its 
economic development (Berger 1997, 100; Jonas and Walker 2000, 5). 
Throughout the authoritarian period and to the present day the economy 
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has been dependent on agricultural products (primarily bananas, sugar, 
and coffee). This dependence has led to the unrestricted use of land 
which resulted in degraded soil conditions, polluted waters, and 
deforestation throughout the country.  
 Environmentalists in Guatemala are routinely threatened by the 
military who objects to protected reserves. The military in addition tells 
the locals that environmentalists are attempting to take away their 
livelihood by creating protected areas (Berger 1997, 106). This has 
resulted in tense relations between environmentalists and local 
residents. Similar to Chile, the environmental movement in Guatemala 
did consist of various interests; but, unlike Chile, all social movements 
were oppressed and all proposals objectionable to the military labeled 
communist (Zarate 1994, 61). The principle objective of the state has 
been economic development with little regard for the environment. This is 
contrary to public opinion probably because the poorer sectors of the 
population know they will not benefit from economic growth. 
 Still, alleviating poverty in Guatemala must remain the priority of 
any governing regime. This necessitates policies that protect the 
environment but not at the expense of economic growth. For this reason 
most attempts at environmental protection have come from abroad with 
acquiescence from the state, not necessarily avid support. There have 
been efforts at such programs. The principal effort has been in the form 
of promoting ecotourism. State programs often fail simply as a result of 
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the indigenous population isolating themselves and disregarding national 
regulations. Bascomb and Taylor (2008) advocate ecotourism as a way to 
incorporate indigenous demands and national policy into a sustainable 
project. This would be done by tying the success of the industry to the 
quality of life of the local residents. Bascomb and Taylor examine the 
benefits ecotourism has had on the village of Chicacnab in the Central 
part of the country and note ecotourism has been beneficial for local 
residents. Yet the industry, while not failing, has not thrived. This is a 
result of high crime rates and continued social conflict within the state. 
The U.S. State Department has consistently issued travel warnings to 
Americans traveling in the area. Another issue area has been oil 
exploration. Imports of oil account for 10 percent of all imports which is 
a heavy burden on the state. As a result when a proposal is offered the 
state is eager to accept despite the environmental hazards posed and the 
displaced persons it results in (Trudeau 1993, 164).  
In regards to deforestation, politicians often hold the view that the 
land itself is more valuable than the trees that reside on the land 
(Richards & Tucker 1988). The regulation of forests is the responsibility 
of the local municipalities. The 1985 constitution requires 8 percent 
(increased to 10 percent in 1994) of the national budget be transferred to 
the municipalities. However, Guatemala ranks among the least taxing 
states in Latin America. This is partially the result of international 
lending institutions (FAO 1999) that believe decentralization leads to 
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more efficient management. This assumes that the local population and 
governing elite will place emphasis on protection of the forests. This has 
not been the case in Guatemala. In a survey of Guatemalan mayors 
Gibson and Lehoucq (2003) find that protection of the forests is not a 
priority for the local governments and when staff is allocated to 
protection of the forests it is only to secure federal financing. Guatemala 
has been seen as a potential carbon sink to offset carbon emissions. An 
independent power agency Applied Energy Service (AES) gave Guatemala 
USD 2 million (renewed in 2000) to protect a forest which would offset 
the emissions AES produced in Connecticut. However, with enforcement 
of forestry protection being shifted to municipal areas reforestation 
projects has slowed and an inhospitable population has threatened 
reforestation efforts (Wittman & Caron 2009, 715). The protected area 
created as a result of AES financing has taken away wood which is the 
primary energy source of local communities. Furthermore, Brown and 
Delaney (1999) have found that the project has not sequestered the 11 
million tons of carbon predicted by AES and the World Resources 
Institute (WRI). Rather they conclude around 275 thousand pounds have 
been sequestered. This shows the lack of expertise on the ground and the 
uncertain nature of such projects. Debt for nature swaps have been 
another international effort at helping lower Guatemalan debt 
simultaneously protecting the environment. In one of the largest debt for 
nature swaps the United States lowered Guatemala’s debt 20 percent for 
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four regions (Ness 2006). The money is expected to support financing of 
park rangers and monitoring. Given the lack of attention given to 
indigenous groups demands it is unlikely they will be cooperative in 
these efforts. 
Political Institutions 
The Executive 
The executive in Chile is among the most powerful in Latin 
America. In fact Shugart and Mainwaring (1997) list Chile’s executive as 
the most powerful in all of Latin America (table 1.6, p 49). Siavelis (1997) 
gives an account of the formal powers the executive has compared to the 
legislature. Among the most useful tools at the executive’s disposal is the 
ability to issue executive urgencies which must be considered before 
anything else by the legislature. This allows the executive to control the 
legislative agenda and possibly prevent any other legislation from being 
debated. The president can also call the assembly into session. During 
these sessions the legislature can only consider proposals initiated by the 
executive. Possibly the most important power granted to the executive is 
control over the budget. The executive has almost exclusive control over 
the budgetary process. The legislature may only reduce or approve the 
budget. If neither is done within 60 days the budget goes into affect 
without legislative approval. The power of the purse allows the executive 
to control the finances of the various agencies. This permits the preferred 
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projects of the president to get full consideration and less important 
items to be disregarded or neglected entirely.  
During the initial period of democracy the environment was low on 
the list of priorities. Rather, democratic consolidation, maintaining 
economic growth, and human rights issues were of primary interests. By 
the second president (Patricio Aylwin) the environment began to gain 
some attention; too much as it turned out. The Aylwin presidency was 
based on compromise and his coalition was tenuous. He therefore did 
not want to offend too many by pushing an agenda supported by a few. 
For this reason he took a middle ground position by continuing programs 
from the Pinochet era to protect the environment. These were all market-
based approaches which adhered to the tenets of the neo-liberal model. 
For this reason the policy of gradualism emerged whereby first priority 
would be given to those issues which would generate the least conflict. 
None of the regulations imposed on the business sector would be too 
onerous and the enforcement agency was made to be more of a 
coordinating institution (Silva 1996, 24). 
The Guatemalan executive is in charge of appointments to the 
bureaucracy. Therefore similar to Chile and Brazil an executive 
interested in ecological preservation can strengthen the bureaucracy but 
this has yet to be the case. As a result, the marginalization of 
environmental issues has continued once again showing the lack of 
change from authoritarian rule to a prima facie democracy. The executive 
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has been seen as corrupt and nepotistic (Jonas 1995, 33). In 1993, in an 
attempt to overcome stalemate between the legislature and the executive 
President Serrano (with military support) dissolved Congress and the 
Supreme Court. Attempts were made to reduce the size of the legislature 
which would make coalition building easier and increase the power of the 
executive. However, due to pressure from the U.S. and civil unrest the 
military turned against Serrano and ordered his exile. The continued 
instability in Guatemala and the central role of the military in the policy 
process has inhibited proposals that threaten the landed elite from 
coming forth. The corruption that plagued Serrano’s presidency was a 
consequence of his inability to get legislation passed. It is estimated he 
spent nearly USD 50 million a year on buying votes in the Congress 
(Cameron 1998, 134). Aside from Serrano all Guatemalan executives 
have had a majority in Congress yet have not been able to fulfill their 
campaign promises (Negretto 2006, 73). 
Rather than alienate the military, all executives up until 1996 
continued the civil war. The continuation of the civil war resulted in the 
disregard for all other functions of the state. In addition the lack of party 
discipline and the multitude of political parties have led to an executive 
unable to build a coalition (Carey 2007, 98). In short the executive is not 
independent of the military. The executive serves at the behest of the 
military and when attempts are made to become independent the 
military has removed that president. Things have changed in recent 
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years. The autogolpe attempted by Serrano has actually helped to further 
democracy simply because it failed (Cameron 1998). However, the 
interests of the military remain the same and social reform has not 
occurred. For instance Guatemala’s tax as a percentage of total GDP was 
the lowest in Latin America at 6 percent in 1990. However, since 1996 
this has increased rapidly and reached 11 percent by 2006. This shows 
that there is a move toward greater accountability but the inability of the 
legislature to reach a consensus has led to stalemate. In contrast to Chile 
the Guatemalan executive is very weak relative to the legislature. The 
Chilean executive dominates the legislative agenda, prioritizes issues, 
controls the budget, and maintains strict control over his or her party. 
The Guatemalan executive has none of these attributes (Aleman 2006, 
140). The environment as a result is of secondary interest to an executive 
that prioritizes continued economic growth. Secondly, the executive is 
more difficult for ENGOs to petition in comparison to individual 
legislators. If an executive decides reduce the budget for environmental 
programs the legislature can do nothing. 
The Legislature 
It has already been shown how the executive can control the 
legislative agenda. However, it could be argued the legislature can simply 
vote down all of the executive’s proposals and move on to concerns of its 
own. This would not occur for three reasons. First, if the executive’s 
proposals were voted down simply for this reason they could simply be 
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proposed again to be heard at the same legislative session. Second, 
parties are strong and there are strong incentives to cooperate with the 
executive so as to achieve other goals specific to individual legislators 
(Carey & Siavelis 2005). Third, the legislature does not have the 
resources to carry out the necessary research nor the expertise needed to 
formulate good policy. 
Political parties are strong in Chile and party discipline is adhered 
to in the legislature. There are two main parties in Chile the 
Concertacion and the Alliance for Chile. These parties however are 
coalitions of parties and therefore represents a diverse and large 
populace. The Chilean system has been a multiparty system since 
democracy first emerged in 1932, which necessitated coalitions. Such 
coalitions, it has been argued, led to the coup of 1973 (Linz and Stepan 
1996; Aguero 2003; Scully 1995). The gridlock caused by diverse 
interests worked initially but faltered which led to the socialist candidate 
Salvador Allende gaining the presidency which in turn led to the coup by 
Pinochet. This is part of the reason the legislature was made weak 
relative to the executive to avoid such problems again (Baldez & Carey 
1999, 30-31). Nevertheless, political parties have resumed their place at 
the center of the Chilean political process (Scully 1995, 123).  
The legislature is often perceived as the best route for civil society 
to pressure the state to achieve its goals. However, in Chile the 
legislature is strictly forbidden from proposing legislation which deals 
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with “social issues” (Siavelis 1997, 329). This is a result of Pinochet’s 
influence over the drafting of the constitution currently in effect. Only the 
executive may initiate bills which deal with social issues. This was an 
attempt to ensure that no socialist measures were proposed by the 
legislature. Pinochet believed he would be elected to the presidency so he 
intentionally made the executive stronger relative to the legislature. If 
such legislation is proposed two things can occur. First, the legislation 
can be declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Tribunal. Second, 
the legislator who proposed the legislation can be removed from office 
(ibid, 329). This restriction on the legislature has had the beneficial affect 
of preventing rampant clientelistic behavior. This has however resulted in 
the inability of ENGOs to pressure the legislature for reform. Rather all 
pressure must be directed at the executive and ministerial level. Neither 
of which have been eager to change existing environmental policies.  
Another impediment to proper legislation within the legislature is 
the lack of staff granted to legislators. This translates into insufficient 
expertise on most policy issues. Environmental protection is an area 
which requires long term investments and careful planning. The 
executive in contrast has access to a large staff and control over the 
ministries which are charged with specific tasks. Asymmetric information 
grants the executive an informal power which adds to the power of the 
office. A problem that arises is the protection of the environment requires 
long term policies and enforcement but if an executive comes to office 
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and chooses to neglect those policies the legislature has little recourse 
because it does not control the budgetary process. The system in place 
restrains spending by the legislature and greatly favors the executive 
(Baldez & Carey 1999, 34). Environmental protection requires investment 
of money, staff, and time none of which are controlled by the legislature.  
 Another avenue available to reduce the asymmetrical nature of the 
policy process is the availability of academics and think tanks to advise 
legislators on a pro bono basis (Siavelis 1997, 333). However, when 
commissioned by the state to produce a report on the status of the 
forests the results were not to the liking of the forestry sector and as a 
result the director of the project has been fired and the rest of the 
collaborators have faced disciplinary action (Clapp 1998, 30). Such 
actions were undertaken by the military regime and continue under the 
democratic regime of today. For this reason academics would rather not 
undertake such projects out of fear of repercussions. As a result the 
congress simply meets with the minister in charge of certain areas so as 
to become informed of potential policy proposals and the subsequent 
effect (Siavelis 1997, 353.)  
Parties are disciplined in Chile but the executive needs a majority 
to achieve its stated goals. There are two main parties in Chile which vie 
for power and as a result could pose the challenges found in Brazil. 
However, with the executive controlling the agenda and the budget it is 
incumbent upon legislators of all parties to cooperate with the executive 
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to achieve their goals as well. Carey and Siavelis (2005) examine how 
Chile’s Concertacion party is able to hold together its coalition. The use 
of complex informal incentives has proven effective at maintaining party 
discipline. Chile’s electoral system uses two member districts with 
proportional representation. It is not the two candidates with the most 
votes that attain office rather it is the two parties that achieve the most 
votes unless two candidates from the same party receive a super majority 
of the vote.18 For this reason parties always place one strong candidate 
with one weak candidate in districts where they are unlikely to achieve 
the supermajority. In districts where a supermajority is possible two 
strong candidates are paired together in the event the supermajority is 
not achieved the unelected candidate is guaranteed a position in the 
ministry of the executive the next time the party controls the executive.  
Guatemala, in contrast, has a multitude of parties and party 
discipline is non-existent. Party proclamations are only made around 
election season and promises made are forgotten shortly after (Azpuru 
2008). In the immediate transition to democracy political parties were 
severely restricted (hence the semi-democratic nature of the current 
regime). Even still the parties that did emerge were not strong, did not 
subscribe to an ideology, fragmented overall, and no dominant party 
emerged like in Chile (Granados 1992, 100). Guatemalan legislators 
                                                 
18 A supermajority would occur in one of two situations the same party receives two-
thirds of the vote or if both candidates (independently of each other) receive double the 
vote of the third place candidate. 
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wield some control over bureaucratic appointments but any 
appointments made have not been for the benefit of regulations. 
Patronage appointments are made not to ensure re-election but to simply 
earn money, vote buying is a common phenomenon in the state (Jonas 
1995, 33). Electoral laws also restrict the ability of the indigenous 
population to be represented at the national level. Each party must 
achieve a minimum threshold in all the provinces to nominate a 
candidate for national office (Mumme & Korzetz 1997, 48). Given the 
high concentration of indigenous peoples in only the Northern provinces, 
representation of their interests has been negligible. This has led to 
frictions between the state and the indigenous populace. Many actions 
are taken without the interests of the locals taken into consideration. For 
this reason like in Chile the indigenous people have not adhered to 
national laws. Legislators are given plenty of time to contemplate a bill 
before it is voted upon. This time is used not to judge the merits of 
proposed law rather it is to delay votes (Aleman 2006, 133). 
The Bureaucracy 
Chile has been effective at enacting the legislation it has passed; 
there have been few rifts between elected officials and the bureaucracy. 
The bureaucracy is formally controlled by the executive and the budget is 
determined by the executive which strengthens executive influence over 
the bureaucracy. As has been stated above many cabinet level positions 
are granted as a result of risking one’s office for the benefit of the 
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coalition. These positions can be seen as a form of patronage 
appointments. The difference is that the individuals appointed to these 
positions are from the same political party and are qualified in policy 
formation. These two factors greatly distinguish Chile’s patronage 
positions to that of Brazil where patronage appointments lead to 
incompetent staff and disagreements within the executive branch. In this 
regard Chile is closer to Costa Rica in its ability to enforce the laws that 
it passes. This ability is not overwhelmingly seen by the citizenry where 
only 53 percent, in 2005, believe the state is able to enforce the law 
(Latino Barometer 2005).  
The ministries are directed by an expert in that field and assist the 
executive and the legislature in formulating policy which correctly 
addresses potential problems. Many of the experts in the environmental 
arena came to their positions from the position in the environmental 
movement which pressured for greater environmental protection during 
the Pinochet era. Carruthers (2001) has criticized this movement because 
it has resulted in a “brain drain” within the environmental movement. 
This change in position has resulted in good policy which has continued 
to alleviate many environmental problems. Albeit the gradual approach 
taken by the various ministries takes time and results are not easily 
noticeable but the institutions need the time to adjust and learn from 
their mistakes which is possible in Chile. Reform of state programs is 
plausible which allows for improved policy over time. Despite the rise in 
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certain environmental indicators the Chilean system is equipped to cope 
with the deleterious effects of environmental degradation if compelled to 
do so. The governing elite have been hesitant to enact reform which could 
alienate the military and possibly lead to another coup19. For this reason 
the Concertacion has intentionally designed policies to prevent the 
unification of the political parties on the right. This has kept the 
opposition fragmented and largely unable to prevent the state from 
pursuing its agenda.  
This could easily change though. It is the fear of a military 
intervention and opposition to Pinochet that has kept the Concertacion 
unified. Pinochet was increasingly marginalized and the political right 
made progress in achieving a larger share of the electoral vote in 
congressional and executive elections. If the Concertacion were to lose 
the executive the position of executive level appointments would no 
longer hold and the coalition would be less capable of a unified front. 
Another weakness is the lack of oversight granted to the legislature vis a 
vis the bureaucracy. The legislature is granted the ability to petition 
ministers for questioning yet the minister can be as vague as he or she 
desires (Siavelis 2000, 76). The executive maintains sole control over the 
removal of ministers. This eliminates the ability of the legislature to 
reprimand individuals for poor performance. Again the lack of resources 
                                                 
19 This is not a far fetched possibility in May of 1993 General Pinochet had public 
buildings in Santiago surrounded by the military in response to human rights 
investigations. Radical policies could have the same effect. 
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and staff granted to legislators further hinders oversight capability. 
Nevertheless, Transparency International has ranked Chile among the 
least corrupt states in Latin America with one of the most responsive 
bureaucracies (cited in Siavelis 2000, 94). This is subject to change when 
the Concertacion coalition loses the executive. Since democracy 
reemerged the Concertacion has controlled both branches of the state 
and there have been few issues of conflict between them. 
The budgets of the two primary environmental protection agencies 
are largely dependent on presidential discretion (Berger 1997, 104). Aside 
from Guatemala being an economically poor state, environmental 
protection has not been a priority of any of the governing regimes. This is 
despite the desire of the people for environmental protection. For this 
reason most financing for environmental projects has come from USAID 
(ibid, 105).  
Political parties in Guatemala are most concerned about patronage 
appointments not to ensure re-election but simply to earn money 
(Granados 1992, 103).  Civil society can provide oversight of polluting 
industries by reporting violations to the National Environmental 
Commission. However, this commission is weak and not well funded to 
conduct the necessary investigations (Mumme & Korzetz 1997, 52). In 
addition, the military is the largest benefactor of illegal cutting of timber 
so any agency workers that attempt to issue citations are physically 
threatened (Berger 1997). The military once again prevents 
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environmental protection laws from being enacted with the exception of 
when there is international involvement. The military is often the only 
presence of the state in remote regions such as the Peten which is largely 
inhabited by indigenous but is home to the largest forests in the state 
(Finley Brook 2007, 104). The fear the indigenous have of the military 
prevents any oversight of military actions. When the international 
community is participating in an endeavor the military does not interfere 
out of fear of repercussions from the international community. 
State capacity in Chile and Guatemala is largely hindered by the 
military. Chile has the capacity to protect the environment but military 
prerogatives override civilian concerns. Guatemala also has the military 
as an obstacle but even if the military were not an obstacle the capacity 
would still be lacking. In Chile there is a bureaucracy that has the 
human capital and the autonomy needed from the legislature to achieve 
its mandate. However, the resources of the bureaucracy are controlled by 
the executive who maintains control over the directors of the various 
branches and over the budget of the various agencies. Autonomy is 
hindered in so far as all social policy must begin with the executive. All 
executives since Pinochet have refused to push social reforms out of fear 
of military retribution. There is no life tenure system in place as is the 
case in Brazil however the expertise accumulated in the bureaucracy and 
the appointment of a cabinet member midway through an executive’s 
term do grant the bureaucracy the autonomy needed to conduct its 
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affairs with impartiality. The problem with the Chilean system is fear of 
reprisals from the military. It is this omnipresent fear that prevents 
reform from taking place. Guatemala lacks capacity in every way 
possible. There is a dearth of expertise in the bureaucracy and 
unwillingness among the political elite to engage in reform. Similar to 
Chile this reluctance for reform is due to fear of military intervention. 
However, without the military there would still be the fragmented party 
system and the common practice of clientelism. Guatemala is the 
archetype of a “personalist” state (Weyland 1994). This is when actors 
within the state perform duties to enrich themselves not society as a 
whole (universalist) or even particular segments of society 
(segmentalists). Rampant corruption at all levels of the state would also 
prevent reform from occurring. 
Civil Society 
 As has been stated civil society groups are often thought to be 
most effective when there are multiple avenues to influence policy. 
However, with power concentrated in the executive and that branch’s 
unwillingness to alienate the business elite environmental pressure has 
faced stiff resistance. For this reason most pressure for greater 
environmental protection has come from abroad. Reasons for protecting 
the environment are more the result of projecting an international image 
than a true desire to protect the environment. It is believed free trade 
agreements will require stricter environmental protection as a result 
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Chile has continued the policies begun by Pinochet. The bi-lateral trade 
pact the United States has in place with Chile did not require stricter 
regulations it has simply required enforcement which Chile has done 
(AJIL 2003). Chile has lacked autonomous organizations willing to press 
the state on behalf of the people since democracy re-emerged (Oxhorn 
1994, 63). The system that has emerged in Chile is largely identified by 
the strength of political parties and the imbalance of power between the 
executive and legislature. These two factors coupled with the hesitance to 
alienate the business elite have led to the marginalization of civil society 
groups which push for greater social welfare policies. Most experts left 
civil society groups to work for the state yet these people have served to 
implement policy not draft policy (Lambrou 1997, 112). The role that 
environmental organizations have been relegated to is monitoring 
compliance with laws. However, with the limited ability of the legislature 
to compel the executive to enforce the law this role has minimal 
significance.  
 Guatemalan civil society organizations like those in Chile 
encompassed many views and objectives. However, the transfer of power 
in Chile led to the incorporation of environmentalists within the state 
this has not been the case in Guatemala. Guatemalan environmentalists 
had just as much success under civilian rule as they had under 
authoritarian rule which is to say success has been elusive. 
Environmentalists joined the state and attempted to establish policy and 
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carry it out but as stated above most endeavors were met with objection 
by the military and the traditional elite. For this reason the relationship 
has not lasted and civil society organizations have been called upon by 
the state on an ad hoc basis to implement certain policies (Berger 1997, 
114). Civil society is also expected to be able to contribute to better policy 
by mobilizing the masses but mass mobilization is sparse in Guatemala 
simply for safety reasons (Booth 2000, 60). Repression of social 
movements is still common in Guatemala and repression is not restricted 
to the indigenous. Gibson and Lehoucq (2003) found that the priority of 
local officials is water, education, and energy production (40-41). The 
emphasis on education is an avenue that civil society can use to educate 
the public about the benefits of environmental preservation as has been 
the case in Costa Rica. However, the fragmented nature of civil society 
has prevented such efforts from emerging. Furthermore, even if there 
was organization the military restricts all aspects of the policy process in 
addition to the implementation of policy. Therefore, the main influence 
area is the military which has completely ignored the environment in 
favor of economic development which benefits themselves in addition to 
the landed elite. 
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Conclusions 
 The comparison of a democratic state with a semi-democratic state 
has shown that as democracy emerges the importance of environmental 
protection increases. This comparison has shown the complete neglect of 
the environment by a military regime and a regime that does not 
necessarily want to protect the environment but has been forced to by 
international demands. Such demands have not been imposed upon 
Guatemala simply because human rights have been the priority of the 
international community. The belief that democracies will do a better job 
at protecting the environment is apparent if only for the disregard of an 
authoritarian rule. Conditions have steadily gotten worse in Guatemala 
even after the transition to democracy whereas conditions have gotten 
better in Chile on some indicators (see table 4). The reason for the 
improvement on some indicators and not others is the emphasis given to 
international demands. The international community has consistently 
placed greater emphasis on deforestation and less on local conditions. 
The same is true for Guatemala all international attention has been 
focused on deforestation and not on water sanitation which is the main 
priority of municipal governments.  
 Guatemala and Chile represent two ends of a continuum. Chile is 
among the richer states in all of Latin America while Guatemala is at the 
lower end of the spectrum. Guatemala can hardly be considered 
democratic while Chile has certain undemocratic features. However, the 
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democratic features that Chile does have has allowed for the successful 
petition of international NGOs in collaboration with local groups to 
ensure the continued protection of the environment. In contrast with the 
subservience of all branches of the state to military interests no 
organizations have been able to successfully implement environmental 
programs of any kind.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This work began by exploring a single topic – the relationship 
between democracy and the environment. A few things have been 
discovered along the way about what democracy is and is not. It has 
been shown that the relationship between democracy and the 
environment is contingent on a few factors which are reviewed below.  
The Importance of Institutions 
Advocates of democracy often conceptualize democracy to be a 
panacea. This ignores political reality as it assumes all democratic states 
are representative when they are not. As the cases of Brazil and Chile 
show a state can be democratic and still not represent the interests of 
the masses. The two states do not reflect public opinion for different 
reasons though. Brazil is incapable of reflecting the interests of the 
people as a result of weak party systems; whereas Chile does not as a 
result of an excessive concentration of power within the executive 
branch. These cases show how the representative nature of democracy is 
contingent on the distribution of powers within the state. The founding of 
a state can largely determine how representative the state will be. 
Transitions take form a number of ways. There is transition from above 
whereby the political elite grant democracy to the population (i.e. 
Argentina and Chile) there is transition from below whereby the masses 
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have forced democratization despite objections from the elite (e.g. 
Venezuela and Mexico). These two processes typify Latin America 
however the latter is especially problematic because when 
democratization from above occurs there are individuals who know they 
can control the process. This is clearly the case with the transition for 
Chile where Pinochet knew he could shape the outcome of democracy to 
suit his interests. He may not have won the presidency but the 
democracy that emerged was largely his creation and not against his best 
interests. With democratization from below actors vying for political 
power are working behind John Rawl’s “veil of ignorance” (1971). When 
this takes place a more just and open society can be expected to emerge. 
However, the states that have been most stable in Latin America have 
been transitions from above (Karl 1990, 9). In most instances actors do 
know their relative strength which makes bargaining and compromise 
more difficult if a group has too much power it can be expected that the 
political system that emerges will benefit that group more so than others. 
In short the advocates of democracy focus too much on an 
idealized form of what democracy should be and not on what democracy 
is. Simply because a state has the procedural requirements of democracy 
does not guarantee the state will reflect the interests of the masses. 
State’s that lack representativeness will not perform the function that 
Payne and others predict. 
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The case studies show the importance that political institutions 
have in shaping the environmental agenda. Many advocates of 
environmental protection propose working at the grass roots level to 
further the cause of environmental protection. However, the central 
government is where an abundance of resources lie. Even in states that 
grant strong powers to the local government power tends to shift toward 
the central government as has been the case in Costa Rica and the 
United States. This is not to say that grass root initiatives are futile it is 
simply to say greater power is centered in the central government. 
Therefore, it is at the federal level that petitions must take place.  
The case of Brazil shows how institutional gridlock and rent 
seeking inhibit the ability of a democratic state with the resources and 
the will from protecting the environment. In other words, limited state 
capacity and institutional weakness at all levels have prevented civil 
society organizations from petitioning the state as effectively as 
democratic theorists predict. It also shows the importance of strong 
political parties in the democratic process. Guatemala is another 
example of weak political parties that if organized and disciplined might 
be able to counter the influence of the military in social affairs. This work 
agrees with Mainwaring and Scully (1995) insofar that parties “put order 
into what would otherwise be a cacophony of dissonant conflicts” (3). The 
strength of political parties has been to a large degree the source of state 
capacity in Chile and Costa Rica.  
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Do Democracies Protect the Environment Better? 
The statistical analysis shows that democracies do not protect the 
environment better than non-democracies. However, the statistical 
analysis cannot account for the distribution of power within the state 
and the role that political institutions have on the policy process. This 
resulted in the needed for qualitative research. The case studies provided 
show that a regime dominated by the military (Guatemala) gives no 
regard to environment protection. The Guatemalan state has continually 
acted contrary to conservation efforts as a result of its reliance on a 
resource economy. Chile, which is also heavily dependent on its natural 
resources, is more democratic than Guatemala and has greater state 
capacity. However, in absolute terms Chile has degraded its environment 
more than Guatemala has. It must be taken into account though that 
economic development inherently requires pollution. There is no doubt 
that Guatemala, if the opportunity arose, would pollute just as much as 
Chile for economic gain. The environmental data indicate that pollution 
has continued to increase in Guatemala while Chilean data has mixed 
results. The mixed results of Chile indicate that given proper incentives it 
does have the capacity to protect the environment. The substantive 
difference is that Chile is attempting to protect the environment while 
Guatemala is not.  
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An even more democratic country than Chile is Brazil. Brazil has 
the capacity and the demand among the population to protect the 
environment. However, Brazil has not protected the environment as 
much as theorists predict. This is a result of the fragmented nature of 
the political system. In Chile there is too much power concentrated in the 
executive whereas Brazil has too much power concentrated in the 
legislature and local government. The Brazilian executive is unable to get 
legislation passed as a result of weak parties. The bureaucracy is used 
for rent seeking and maintains too much autonomy from elected officials. 
Bureaucrats are difficult to remove and appointments are the result of 
patronage not merit. In the Brazilian context the fragmented nature of 
the political system has led to clientelistic behavior in all sources of 
influence. As a result, the landed elite have continued to dominate the 
political process and ensure their interests are not adversely affected. 
The most democratic of all the states studied herein is Costa Rica 
which has protected the environment more than any of the other states. 
This is the result of an equal balance of power between the executive and 
legislature which necessitates cooperation among branches to ensure 
objectives are met regardless of which party controls either branch. 
When democratic theorists are advocating the benefits of democracy 
Costa Rica is the idealized state that is being referred to. The state has 
the resources in terms of human capital and the demand from the 
populace to protect the environment and it has responded. Civil society 
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organizations have been effective at monitoring enforcement of 
regulations and at pushing environmental conservation initiatives. This 
is possible for two reasons. The first is there are several sources of 
influence as the legislature, the executive, and bureaucratic agencies are 
all susceptible to public pressure. The multiple avenues of influence are 
a key factor lacking in both Chile and Guatemala. The second reason is 
the lack of a threat from the military which is non-existent in Costa Rica. 
Civil society is able to be effective because reform is possible in Costa 
Rica. The ability to reform is in many ways a key variable to assure 
environmental protection. Reform is something done either sparingly as 
is the case with Guatemala or difficult to achieve as is the case with 
Brazil and Chile. 
The cases above demonstrate the importance that institutions have 
on environmental protection. Without a system amenable to reform 
improvements in the environmental arena will not be possible simply 
because agencies will be unable to correct their mistakes. A legislature 
responsive to citizen demands is necessary for reform of any kind to 
come to fruition. The weak legislatures in Guatemala and Chile 
demonstrate the inability of civil society to petition the government. 
Brazil does not have a weak legislature rather it has a legislature that 
serve only particular segments of the population with no regard for 
government efficiency. 
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What Does this Mean for Democracy? 
 Democracy is an essentially contested concept. Just about every 
scholar has a different definition of the term. Democracy as the 
introduction demonstrations can be operationalized in a number of 
different ways. There are dichotomous forms, trichotomous forms, and 
scores along a number line ranging from negative 10 to plus 10, and 
from zero to one hundred. There are states that are clearly authoritarian 
(i.e. the Congo under Mobutu; Liberia under Taylor) however even these 
states represented the interests of some segments of the population. For 
instance the United States is categorized as a democracy in the 1800s by 
the Polity dataset despite widespread restrictions on suffrage; whereas 
South Africa during apartheid was considered semi-democratic for the 
same restrictions. What is the difference? 
 Many datasets continue to use a retrospective standard judging 
democracies based on the standards of their day not based upon 
procedural requirements (Paxton 2000). Such measures are 
underspecified and lead to confusion as to the transition to democracy.    
Democracy is best viewed along a never ending continuum. By viewing 
democracy along a never ending continuum we can account for 
gradations of democracy over time within the state and notice 
substantive differences in “representativeness.” States should not be 
judged undemocratic simply because they do not meet the standards of 
the day; rather they should be judged based on their own history with 
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democracy. If a state has suffrage restricted based upon class but the 
next year eliminate that restriction they are clearly more democratic 
despite maintaining other restrictions. Democracy itself is in constant 
flux and as a result must be considered on a continuum that will never 
end (Markoff 1996). Mainwaring et al (2007) acknowledge the constant 
changes in democracy and the difficulty in classifying representativeness 
but refuse to attempt the measurement due to the high degree of 
difficulty (128).  
While there are various gradations of democracy there are two 
discernible types of democracy. These are representative democracy and 
procedural democracy. The former is procedural yet it entails a 
representative function not inherent in the latter. Representative 
democracies are those democracies where public opinion matters. 
Procedural democracy has the electoral and civil liberties needed for 
elected officials to have legitimacy from the masses but without 
institutions responsive to the masses they cannot be considered 
representative. Several indices measure procedural democracy but none 
measure representativeness. For this reason statistical analysis that 
attempt to use democracy as an explanatory variable will have 
misleading results. The absence of an index that measures 
representativeness necessitates qualitative research to determine the 
source of responsive and effective government. 
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Conclusions 
 This study has shown that the establishment of a democratic state 
does not guarantee environmental protection. However, it should be clear 
that environmental protection will not be provided under authoritarian 
rule either. The military regime of Guatemala gives no regard to the 
environment and the Chilean military regime only protected the 
environment due to international pressure. The four case studies have 
differing levels of democracy and differing levels of environmental 
protection. It is noticeable that given the proper institutional structure, 
the resources, along with the demand for environmental protection 
democracies will protect the environment better than less democratic 
states. There are a number of prerequisites for environmental protection 
to occur. The first is the state must have the economic resources to make 
protection feasible, second is the citizenry demanding such protection, 
and finally is a state responsive to the populace. The final requirement 
makes democracy a necessary but not a sufficient condition for 
environmental protection. 
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